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The rural poor [in Mexico] growing maize for subsistence saw
their livelihoods destroyed by a ﬂood of cheap U.S. imports.
—Oxfam brieﬁng on agricultural subsidies, 2002
It must be acknowledged that unqualiﬁed assertions by many,
including the heads of some multilateral institutions, that sub-
sidies and other interventions in agriculture in the OECD
countries are hurting the poor countries are not grounded in
facts....  T h e  claim that the change will bring net gains to the
least developed countries as a whole is at best questionable
and at worst outright wrong.
—Economist Arvind Panagariya, 2002
5.1 Introduction
Rich countries are under increasing pressure from around the world to
end support to agriculture. Agricultural subsidies and price supports al-
low Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)
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are below the cost of production.1 Critics claim that these policies inﬂict
harm on poor countries by depressing world commodity prices.2 They ar-
gue further that these policies are likely to hurt the poorest residents of the
poor countries because poor people are often farmers. Thus, eliminating
support for rich-country farmers will raise world prices and the incomes of
the poor. Our goal in this paper is to evaluate these claims systematically
by measuring the impact of OECD agricultural policies on poverty in de-
veloping countries.
Because of the diversity both within and among developing countries,
the extent to which rich-country support policies translate into lower in-
comes in developing countries is an empirical question. Many least devel-
oped countries, especially in Africa, are net importers of food. As net food
importers, they may be hurt by higher commodity prices (Panagariya 2002,
2004a; Valdes and McCalla 1999). Some countries may import cereals,
such as maize and rice, but export other agricultural products, such as
sugar or cotton. Higher prices for exports and imports will have net eﬀects
that are diﬃcult to predict ex ante. Even within importing countries, the
poorest members of society may be net sellers of food.
We begin our analysis with an investigation into the relationship be-
tween income per capita and the value of net cereal, food, and agricultural
(food plus nonfood) exports for each of the three decades leading up to
2000. We ﬁnd that—on average—the poorest countries have historically
been net importers of cereals and food, the products most heavily sup-
ported by the OECD countries, just as they are today. That this pattern has
not changed over the past thirty years casts some doubt on the notion that
“dumping” turned exporters into importers. We also ﬁnd that the poorest
countries are—on average—net exporters of all agricultural products.
However, with the important exception of cotton, the nonfood agricultural
products are typically not the products supported by the OECD.3
What about the poor people in poor countries? To determine whether
OECD policy hurts the poorest residents of the poor countries, we use a
cross-country regression framework in which the head count poverty rate
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1. Transfers to agricultural producers from consumers and taxpayers as a result of income
and price support policies equaled $21,000 per farmer in the United States and $16,000 per
farmer in the European Union (EU) in 1998–2000 (OECD 2001). This is almost 100 times
greater than per capita incomes in the least developed countries.
2. James D. Wolfensohn, president of the World Bank, has stated that rich countries are
“squandering” $1 billion a day on farm subsidies that hurt farmers in Latin America and
Africa. Stanley Fischer, who was the deputy managing director of the International Mone-
tary Fund (IMF) in the 1990s, has said the United States, Europe, and Japan pursue agri-
cultural protection policies that are “scandalous” because of the harm they inﬂict on poor
countries (Andrews 2002). Some also argue that these subsidies increase the volatility of com-
modity prices since support policies that are countercyclical with respect to domestic prices
or shocks provide incentives for increased production when world prices are relatively low. 
3. Panagariya (2004b) has recently made a similar point.(or average income) is the dependentvariable.Our innovation is to include
as an explanatory variable a measure of rich-country support for the agri-
cultural products produced in the developing country in question.4 To our
knowledge, this is the ﬁrst use of this strategy to quantify the impacts of
rich-country agricultural support policies on poor countries.5 Also using
this framework, we assess the relative importance of own-country charac-
teristics and policies. We ﬁnd no support in the cross-country analysis for
the claim that—on average—OECD policies worsen poverty in develop-
ing countries.
To better understand the within-country distributional implications of
rich-country agricultural subsidies, we complement our macro work with
a case study of Mexican corn farmers using data at the farmer and house-
hold level. This case is instructive for several reasons. First, Mexico is of-
ten oﬀered as a cautionary example of the impacts of agricultural trade lib-
eralization on rural poverty. Second, the case of Mexico raises a number of
issues, such as the importance of domestic policy, which can help to inform
our cross-country analysis. Finally, we choose Mexico because rich na-
tionally representative and previously unexploited data sets are available.6
Evidence from Mexico conﬁrms the importance of domestic policies
relative to international policies that aﬀect commodity border prices, and
highlights the importance of distributional issues masked by the cross-
country analysis. In the mid-1990s the Mexican government initiated the
liberalization of the corn sector in Mexico. As anticipated, this liberaliza-
tion led to a sharp decrease in the producer price of corn and an increase
in Mexican corn imports from the United States. Because this liberaliza-
tion took place in the context of U.S. corn subsidies that lower border
prices, the United States is sometimes held responsible for the price decline
and increased poverty among Mexican corn farmers. Contrary to this
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4. We introduce a new variable into a standard cross-country regression framework previ-
ously employed by others including Easterly and Levine (2003); Rodrik, Subramanian, and
Trebbi (2002); Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001); and Frankel and Romer (1999).
5. There is some evidence that terms of trade can aﬀect incomes and poverty in developing
countries. Sarel (1997) presents evidence that improvements in terms of trade are signiﬁcantly
negatively correlated with changes in income inequality in an ordinary least squares (OLS) re-
gression. He argues that since “policies can rarely aﬀect directly terms of trade dynamics,” the
implications of this ﬁnding are limited. However, policy changes in the OECD can directly
aﬀect the magnitude and nature of agricultural support, which in turn may aﬀect commodity
prices and developing countries’ terms of trade. Acemoglu and Ventura (2002) present evi-
dence that terms of trade may be quantitatively important for explaining cross-country in-
come diﬀerences using an instrumental variables approach to account for the endogenous re-
lationship between growth and changes in terms of trade.
6. Our data on Mexico come from INEGI (the Mexican Statistical Agency) and are drawn
from two diﬀerent surveys, the Encuesta Nacional de Empleo (ENE), an individual-level na-
tional employment survey, which includes a rich agricultural supplement, and the Encuesta
Nacional de Ingresos y Gastos de los Hogares (ENIGH), a household-level income and ex-
penditure survey. Both surveys were conducted both pre- and post-NAFTA, though not al-
ways for the same years.popular view, our evidence suggests that U.S. corn subsidies have had a
limited impact on the border price of corn. In addition, because the ma-
jority of the poorest corn farmers do not sell corn in the market, their in-
comes were not directly aﬀected by the decline in the producer price of
corn. By contrast, a majority of the medium-sized and large corn farmers
do participate in the market. Medium-sized corn farmers experienced a
sharp decline in real income, while the income of the largest corn farmers
actually increased. Transfer payments to all corn farmers—also part of the
corn market liberalization—increased but were structured so that beneﬁts
went disproportionately to the rich farmers.
Our results stand in stark contrast to the large body of literature that has
been devoted to examining the potential impact of agricultural trade liber-
alization on developing countries using computable general equilibrium
(CGE) models.7 While the magnitudes of CGE estimates vary, agricultural
trade liberalization is typically predicted to increase world commodity
prices to the overall beneﬁt of developing countries. For example, Beghin,
Roland-Holst, and van der Mensbrugghe (2002) estimate that the removal
of all agricultural subsidies and trade barriers could increase rural value
added in low- and middle-income countries by $60 billion per year, which,
as they note, exceeds most targets for development assistance by some 20
percent. Probably the most important reason for the diﬀerences in results
is that other studies have not focused explicitly on poverty but rather on de-
veloping countries as a whole. Additionally, as pointed out by Panagariya
(2004b), many studies combine liberalization by developing countries with
liberalization by developed countries when estimating welfare impacts. We
focus solely on the impacts of rich-country policies on poor countries and
the poor residents of these countries.
In interpreting our results, a few caveats are in order. First, our measure
of OECD policy is eﬀectively the production-weighted average implicit ex-
port subsidy faced by each country in our sample. A variety of other OECD
actions such as support for minor crops, import tariﬀs on products not
produced domestically (e.g., coﬀee), phytosanitary regulations, and dis-
cretionary protection applied when imports rise may also be important for
developing countries but are beyond the scope of this paper. Second, our
measure of OECD policy does not include cotton, a key nonfood product
that is heavily subsidized by the United States in a way that harms some very
poor countries. Cotton is not included because the OECD calculates sup-
port only for the major commodities that make up the ﬁrst 70 percent of the
total value of agricultural production. However, in our view, the inclusion of
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7. See, for example, OECD (2002); Economic Research Service/U.S. Department of Agri-
culture (ERS/USDA; 2002); Trueblood and Shapouri (1999); Hoekman, Ng, and Olarreaga
(2002); and Beghin, Roland-Holst, and van der Mensbrugghe (2002). Note that some CGE-
based studies of the Uruguay Round agreement found results consistent with the focus of this
paper, such as Hertel, Masters, and Elbehri (1998).cotton is unlikely to change our overall ﬁndings because it is only exported
by a handful of the poorest countries and makes up a relatively small share
of these countries’ total agricultural production. Third, while we ﬁnd that on
average OECD support does not increase poverty and that the majority of
poor Mexican corn farmers do not participate in the market, it may still be
the case that many poor people are made poorer by these policies. Roughly
60 percent of the poorest Mexican corn farmers do not participate in the
market. This means that 40 percent of the poorest corn farmers do partici-
pate in the market. For these people, the conclusions about the impacts of de-
pressed corn prices are diﬀerent. Such nuances help us to understand why
diﬀerent groups may have very diﬀerent perspectives on these issues.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 5.2 estab-
lishes the relationships between net exporter status and income for devel-
oping countries over time and in the cross section. Section 5.3 describes the
data and estimation strategy used in the cross-country analysis and presents
these results. Section 5.4 presents an analysis of the impact of a reduction in
the price of corn on Mexico’s corn farmers. Section 5.5 concludes.
5.2 Are the Poorest Countries Hurt by OECD Support for Agriculture?
We begin with an investigation into the relationship between income per
capita (measured in constant 1985 dollars at purchasing power parity [PPP]
exchange rates and collected from the Penn World Tables version 6.1) and
the value of net cereal, net food, and net agricultural exports including non-
food products as a share of GDP (measured at current prices). This can be
thought of as the fraction of current income earned from the sale of these
products or spent to purchase these products. Because there are time series
data on agricultural imports and exports, as well as income, it is possible to
track the behavior of the cohort of developing countries over time.8
We identify the countries that may have been most aﬀected historically
by OECD agricultural policy as those that have spent (earned) the greatest
fraction of income on imports (exports) of supported products. We are
particularly interested in comparing how cereal importers diﬀer from food
or nonfood agricultural exporters because cereal prices are depressed by
OECD agricultural support policies, while the prices of most other food
products (with the important exceptions of dairy and sugar) and nonfood
products (with the important exception of cotton) are largely unaﬀected by
OECD support.
Figures 5.1, 5.2, and 5.3 present data on income earned from agricul-
tural exports in three diﬀerent ways. First, we use data from the Food and
My Policies or Yours: OECD Support for Agriculture 187
8. Other authors have also presented data to highlight the diverse agricultural trade proﬁle
of developing countries (Valdes and McCalla 1999; Panagariya 2002, 2004a) but have em-
phasized cross-sectional patterns only. This snapshot of countries’ trade positions may ob-
scure long-run patterns in the data.Agriculture Organization (FAO) to calculate the value of annual net cereal
exports as a percentage of GDP for a sample of ninety-nine developing
countries and take the average value of this number for the periods 1970–
79, 1980–89, and 1990–2000.9 We show the cross-sectional income proﬁle
for these three time periods in ﬁgure 5.1 by using a locally weighted re-
gression of decadal average cereal export share on the decadal average of
the log of income per capita (bandwidth   0.8). We run the same regres-
sions for food export share and present those results in ﬁgure 5.2. Figure
5.3 shows the regressions for agricultural export shares (including nonfood
products such as green coﬀee and ﬁbers).
Figure 5.1 shows that, in each decade, the poorest countries spend the
largest percentage of their incomes on cereal imports, suggesting that they
may experience net beneﬁts as a result of depressed cereal prices. In fact,
so few developing countries are net cereal exporters in any decade that the
predicted net cereal export share is negative even at the highest income
levels observed in the data.10
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Fig. 5.1 Average income and net cereal exports by decade in a repeated cross sec-
tion of developing countries
9. The sample includes three transition economies: Poland, Romania, and Hungary. The
FAO deﬁnition of cereals includes wheat, paddy rice, barley, maize, popcorn, rye, oats, mil-
let, sorghum, buckwheat, quinoa, fonio, triticale, canary seed, and mixed grains.
10. Among countries for which data are available, Thailand, Argentina, Nepal, Zimbabwe,
South Africa, Uruguay, Pakistan, Kenya, and Guyana had positive average net export earn-
ings from cereals in the 1970s. This list expanded to include Vietnam in the 1980s but lost
Nepal and Kenya. In the 1990s, Guyana, Argentina, Thailand, Vietnam, Hungary, Paraguay,
India, and Pakistan had positive net export earnings from cereals.Fig. 5.2 Average income and net food exports by decade in a repeated cross section
of developing countries
Fig. 5.3 Average income and net agriculture exports by decade in a repeated cross
section of developing countriesSince 1970 the poorest countries have also experienced the smallest re-
duction in net expenditures on cereal exports as a share of GDP. To trace
the average cereal export share of a given country experiencing economic
growth, points should be connected not within years but across the regres-
sion lines, linking up the experience and behavior of a like country in the
following decade. Thus, the fact that the regression lines are very close to
each other at the lowest levels of income suggests that net export increases
experienced at higher income levels largely bypassed the poorest countries
in the postcolonial era.
These data suggest that depressed prices for food products may hurt
middle-income countries but help the poorest and richest developing coun-
tries. As shown in ﬁgure 5.2, and unlike in the case of cereals alone, among
non-OECD countries only middle-income countries earn income from
food exports. The cross-sectional relationship between net earnings from
all food exports as a share of GDP is nonmonotonic. This production cat-
egory includes noncereal products that receive high levels of support in the
OECD, including sugar, beef, and dairy products, as well as unsubsidized
products such as cocoa and most fruits and vegetables.
The cross-sectional relationship between food export earnings share and
income appears to be ﬂattening over time. In the 1970s, a country with an
income of $1,100 is predicted to have positive net food exports. A country
with this level of income in the 1980s or 1990s is predicted to be a net food
importer. The trend in these data appears to be toward zero net earnings
from food exports. Although it is not shown here, this impression is even
stronger when the sample size is enlarged to include twenty-one high-
income OECD member countries.
Poor countries are most likely to be net exporters of agricultural prod-
ucts in total, as shown in f ﬁgure 5.3.11We run the same regressions to create
this ﬁgure, but we consider all agricultural products, including ﬁbers, indus-
trial seeds, green coﬀee, and tobacco. In this case we ﬁnd a downward-
sloping relationship between net export earnings and income. Relatively
well-oﬀ developing countries import agricultural products as a whole.
This suggests that depressed prices for nonfood agricultural products like
cotton are particularly damaging to the poorest countries.
Figures 5.1, 5.2, and 5.3 together provide evidence that many poor coun-
tries import cereals but export agricultural products as a whole, and have
been in this position throughout the postcolonial era. As we show in table 5.1,
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11. In particular, this category of products includes cotton, an important export crop for
several West African countries as well as Brazil, China, and India. Cotton is excluded from
our regression analysis because, although production data are available from the FAO, sup-
port levels are not calculated for this crop. This support is certainly not trivial; about $2.3 mil-
lion was provided as assistance to U.S. cotton growers in 2001–2 (International Cotton Advi-
sory Committee 2002). The OECD calculates support only for the major commodities that
make up the ﬁrst 70 percent of the total value of agricultural production.Table 5.1 Agricultural trade positions by country (sorted by income)
1990–2000 average percentage of
income earned on net exports of: Fraction of 
Income per  population 
capita 2000,  below $1/day  All  All agriculture 
PPP$(1996) (most recent year) Cereals food (food   nonfood)
Congo, Democratic 
Republic of the 322a –0.54 –1.31 –0.88
Tanzania 482 0.49 –0.49 –0.50 1.50
Burundid 523 0.55 –0.16 –0.61 0.98
Ethiopiad 635 0.23 –0.43 –0.52
Guinea-Bissau 688 –2.23 –0.47 –0.88
Nigeriad 707 0.70 –0.32 –0.70 –0.68
Malawid 784 0.42 –1.22 –1.11 4.70
Yemen, Republic of 817 0.10 –2.24 –5.29 –5.74
Madagascard 836 0.49 –0.27 0.27 0.75
Togod 870 –0.36 –0.72 1.08
Niger 875 0.61 –0.47 –0.48 –0.66
Sierra Leone 889a –1.64 –2.63 –2.64
Zambiad 892 0.64 –0.59 –0.65 –0.51
Rwanda 895 0.36 –0.26 –1.03 –0.42
Chad 909 –0.21 0.28 1.67
Ugandad 941 0.85 –0.07 –0.34 1.36
Burkina Fasod 957 0.45 –0.66 –1.04 –0.71
Malid 969 0.72 –0.25 0.10 1.95
Central African Republicd 992b 0.67 –0.24 –0.54 –0.24
Mozambiqued 1,037 0.38 –0.75 –1.21 –1.47
Benind 1,214 –1.21 –1.97 –0.29
Gambia, Thed 1,217 0.26 –1.94 –4.38 –5.51
Kenyad 1,244 0.23 –0.31 –0.19 2.03
Angola 1,252a –0.51 –2.22 –3.08
Cambodia 1,272c 0.34 –0.13 –0.57 –1.40
Sao Tome and Principe 1,314a –1.27 –2.86
Mauritania 1,315c 0.26 –3.27 –4.06
Ghanad 1,351 0.45 –0.36 1.14 1.11
Nepald 1,459 0.39 –0.02 –0.26 –0.49
Vietnam 1,522a 0.04 0.43 0.54 0.71
Comorosd 1,578 –1.17 –1.29 –1.51
Lesotho 1,592 0.36 –1.10 –5.07 –5.85
Senegald 1,622 0.22 –1.30 –2.42 –2.43
Bangladeshd 1,684 0.36 –0.19 –0.48 –0.52
Nicaraguad 1,767 0.59 –0.59 –0.36 0.84
Congo, Republicd 1,808 –0.65 –2.22 –2.44
Côte d’Ivoired 1,869 0.16 –0.61 4.07 5.93
Pakistand 2,008 0.13 0.02 –0.29 –0.33
Cameroond 2,042 0.32 –0.22 0.29 1.15
Hondurasd 2,050 0.21 –0.42 1.06 2.85
Haitid 2,349b –1.30 –2.87 –2.91
Indiad 2,479 0.45 0.04 0.03 0.12
Zimbabwed 2,486 0.56 –0.06 0.26 2.25
(continued)Table 5.1 (continued)
1990–2000 average percentage of
income earned on net exports of: Fraction of 
Income per  population 
capita 2000,  below $1/day  All  All agriculture 
PPP$(1996) (most recent year) Cereals food (food   nonfood)
Boliviad,e 2,724 0.14 –0.33 0.14 0.58
Guinead 2,831 –0.40 –0.74 –0.76
Papua New Guinead 2,922c –0.53 –0.11 0.80
Sri Lankad 3,300 0.07 –0.35 –0.78 0.22
Philippines, Thed,e 3,425 0.15 –0.25 –0.09 –0.21
Ecuadord 3,468 0.18 –0.18 1.98 2.41
Equatorial Guinea 3,604 –0.68 –1.58
Guyana 3,613c 0.03 1.97 6.36 6.18
Indonesiad,e 3,642 0.07 –0.16 –0.02 0.17
Jamaicad 3,693 0.00 –0.90 –0.91 –0.65
Moroccod 3,717 0.01 –0.44 –0.32 –0.63
Chinad 3,747 0.17 –0.06 0.04 0.01
Jordand 3,895 0.00 –1.66 –3.52 –3.91
Guatemalad,e 3,914 0.16 –0.23 0.80 2.02
Cape Verded 4,027 –1.34 –4.81 –5.73
Syriad 4,094 –0.28 –0.21 –0.09
Egyptd 4,184 0.03 –0.56 –1.09 –1.30
Romaniad 4,285 0.02 –0.06 –0.28 –0.55
El Salvadord 4,435 0.31 –0.30 –0.71 0.29
Namibia 4,459c 0.35 –0.46 0.66 0.77
Perud 4,589 0.18 –0.49 –0.74 –0.60
Paraguayd,e 4,684 0.15 0.05 1.29 1.39
Algeriad 4,896 0.01 –0.80 –1.85 –2.16
Cuba 5,087a –0.52 1.75 1.68
Swaziland 5,227 0.08 –0.37 4.49 3.80
Dominican Republicd 5,270 0.00 –0.46 –0.18 0.03
Colombiad,e 5,383 0.08 –0.19 0.03 1.02
Fijid 5,442c –0.73 2.61 2.39
Lebanon 5,786 –0.72 –4.45 –6.11
Costa Ricad,e 5,870 0.02 –0.53 4.10 6.51
Iran 5,995 0.00 –0.39 –0.59 –0.70
Panamad 6,066 0.07 –0.29 0.48 0.35
Grenadad 6,178 –0.66 –3.72 –4.27
St. Lucia 6,330 0.25 –0.80 –0.15 –1.09
Venezuelad 6,420 0.14 –0.20 –0.54 –0.67
Belize 6,591 –0.35 5.16 4.37
Tunisiad 6,776 0.00 –0.45 –0.34 –0.65
Thailandd,e 6,857 0.02 0.46 1.07 1.41
St. Vincentd 7,148 0.40 2.70 2.09
Brazild,e 7,190 0.08 –0.13 0.30 0.75
Dominicad 7,379 –0.65 2.80 0.25
South Africad,e 7,541 0.11 –0.04 0.18 0.20
Botswana 7,550c 0.31 –0.58 –1.90 –2.67
Gabond 8,402 –0.24 –1.27 –1.52
Mexicod 8,762 0.10 –0.17 –0.28 –0.28which ranks countries by current income per capita and summarizes the data
from the latest decade that are presented graphically in ﬁgures 5.1 through
5.3, many poor countries, and even many middle-income countries, that ex-
port food products import cereals, particularly in the 1990s. Depressed com-
modity prices as a result of domestic support for agriculture in the OECD
could lower the value of both imported products and exported products for
these countries. While it is true that a majority of poor countries are net ex-
porters of agricultural products today (see table 5.1), among the nonfood
products cotton stands out as the only nonfood commodity whose price is
likely to be signiﬁcantly depressed by OECD agricultural support.
Of course, the experience of developing countries is diverse, and, be-
cause they are regressions, ﬁgures 5.1 through 5.3 obscure diﬀerences in
countries’ experiences at any income level. However, these results suggest
that it is unlikely that broad agricultural liberalization, which is likely to re-
sult in higher world prices for cereals as well as dairy products, sugar, and
cotton, will beneﬁt the majority of the poorest countries.
Country-level average values of net cereal or food exports tell us little
about what happens to the poor within a country. Even in countries that
are net importers of food, the poor may be net exporters of food. Thus, a
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Table 5.1 (continued)
1990–2000 average percentage of
income earned on net exports of: Fraction of 
Income per  population 
capita 2000,  below $1/day  All  All agriculture 
PPP$(1996) (most recent year) Cereals food (food   nonfood)
Polandd 9,217 0.01 –0.08 0.14 –0.15
Uruguayd,e 9,622 0.00 0.63 2.27 2.31
Malaysiad,e 9,919 0.00 –0.40 1.36 1.89
Chiled,e 9,926 0.01 –0.13 0.84 1.00
Seychellesd 10,241 –0.90 –5.14 –6.16
Hungaryd 10,439 0.00 0.29 1.89 1.83
Argentinad,e 11,006 0.08 0.56 1.82 2.42
Trinidad and Tobagod 11,175 0.04 –0.41 –1.09 –0.87
St. Kitts and Nevis 13,666 –1.06 –1.95
Mauritiusd 13,932 –0.41 1.43 1.08
Cyprusd 16,063b 0.00 –0.72 –0.58 –0.32
Barbadosd 16,415 0.00 –0.36 –1.30 –1.61
Singapored 22,642b 0.00 –0.22 –1.75 –1.39
Hong Kong, Chinad 26,699 0.00 –0.15 –2.23 –2.87
Source: FAOSTAT, Penn World Tables, World Bank PovertyNet.
aYear of observation 1995.
bYear of observation 1998.
cYear of observation 1999.
dIndicates country included in regression analysis.
eIndicates Cairns Group member.poor country might be hurt by higher food prices while the poor within
that country beneﬁt from higher food prices. The remainder of the paper is
devoted to this issue.
5.3 Does OECD Support Hurt the Poorest People in Poor Countries?
Even if the poorest countries are net importers of products protected
and subsidized by OECD governments, it is possible that the poorest
people within these countries are net sellers of these cheap imports. If this
were the case, then OECD support that beneﬁts the country as a whole
could increase poverty in that same country. In fact, this is a common as-
sumption based on the observation that poverty tends to be concentrated
in rural areas. We begin this section by describing our approach to testing
this hypothesis in a cross-country regression framework. This is followed
by a description of our methodology for obtaining country-speciﬁc mea-
sures of OECD support and a description of our data. We conclude with a
presentation of results.
5.3.1 Empirical Strategy
To test the claim that OECD support for agriculture hurts the poor, we
begin by estimating the following equation:
(1) log HP it    i   log OECDPOLICY it   εit,
where HP is the head count poverty rate for country i at time t based on the
$1-a-day poverty line,  i is a country ﬁxed eﬀect, ε is the disturbance term,
and OECDPOLICY is a country-speciﬁc measure of OECD support that
varies over time and whose construction we discuss in the next subsection.
This simple speciﬁcation allows us to preserve the largest number of obser-
vations for which data on poverty and OECD support are available. In this
speciﬁcation,   represents the elasticity of poverty with respect to OECD
support. Critics of OECD agricultural policy would expect   to be positive
and signiﬁcant. To this basic equation we add additional controls for com-
parability with previous work and to test the notion that own-country poli-
cies are more important than OECD support as determinants of poverty.
One potential problem with this speciﬁcation has to do with the endo-
geneity between OECD support and world commodity prices. OECD
support is a function of commodity price ﬂuctuations and domestic politi-
cal considerations. Commodity price ﬂuctuations can in turn be aﬀected
by OECD policy. Thus, in principle, we need to take care in the interpreta-
tion of  . In other words, we could mistakenly attribute to OECD policy
changes in poverty that are being driven purely by changes in commodity
prices. Practically, this is a moot issue, since we ﬁnd no signiﬁcant rela-
tionship between OECD policy and poverty.
A second problem with this approach is the limited availability of the in-
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cause these data are sparse and since there is a strong association between
average income and poverty reduction, we also consider the impact of
OECD support on average income in developing countries by estimating
the following equation:
(2) log yit    i   log OECDPOLICY it    it,
where  is a country ﬁxed eﬀect,  is the disturbance term, and  represents
the elasticity of poverty with respect to OECD policy. The only diﬀerence
between equation (2) and equation (1) is that in equation (2) we now insert
the log of average income per capita as the dependent variable.
One advantage to estimating equations (1) and (2) is that the time-
invariant factors that aﬀect poverty and income, such as institutions, geo-
graphy, and structural measures of integration, are subsumed in the coun-
try ﬁxed eﬀects. We also control for time-variant global trends that may
aﬀect incomes, such as global weather shocks and energy prices using time
ﬁxed eﬀects.
5.3.2 Data
Our main innovation is in constructing OECDPOLICY, a country- and
year-speciﬁc measure of OECD support to agriculture. Therefore, we de-
vote the majority of this section to describing both how the OECD com-
putes commodity- and year-speciﬁc measures of distortionary support
and how we aggregate these data into variables that can be included in the
regression analysis. We then brieﬂy describe the other variables used in our
analysis.
Since 1987 the OECD has tracked support, by commodity, for agricul-
ture in member countries. The U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA)
has calculated support by commodity and country for the period 1982–90.
In order to use these data to develop the variable OECDPOLICY, we need
to select a measure of domestic support and identify a means of aggregat-
ing support measures across commodities to develop a country-speciﬁc
measure of other countries’ agricultural policies.
The producer support estimate (PSE) is the most commonly used mea-
sure of domestic support for agriculture. The PSE measures the annual
monetary value, at the farm gate, of gross transfers from consumers and
taxpayers to agricultural producers arising from policy measures to sup-
port agriculture.12 The PSE for a commodity is usually presented as a frac-
tion of the value of total gross farm receipts for the commodity. This is re-
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12. The PSE includes domestic subsidies to agriculture, barriers to market access, and ex-
port subsidies. It does not include food aid (OECD 2001). The PSE includes implicit pay-
ments, such as those that arise from commodity-speciﬁc price gaps created by trade barriers,
but excludes gaps between domestic and border prices that may arise because of transporta-
tion costs, quality diﬀerences, or marketing margins.ferred to as the “percent PSE” and measures the portion of farmer receipts
attributable to policy.13
An alternative deﬁnition of trade-distorting support is the producer
nominal protection coeﬃcient (NPC), which is deﬁned as the ratio between
the average price received by producers (at farm gate) and the border price
(net of transportation costs and marketing margins). This is conceptually
equivalent to the implicit export subsidy necessary to export the observed
quantity produced. An NPC equal to one implies that producers receive
border prices for their output after adjusting for transportation costs and
thus do not receive production-distorting signals from agricultural sup-
port policies. The NPC is calculated on a commodity-by-commodity basis
for the OECD as a whole by taking a production-weighted average of pro-
ducer prices and a common border price.
A third measure of support calculated by the OECD is the producer
nominal assistance coeﬃcient (NAC), which is deﬁned as the ratio of the
value of total gross farm receipts, including support, and production val-
ued at world market prices, without support. The NAC is related to the
PSE, but it calculates support independent of exchange rate eﬀects. When
the NAC is equal to one, receipts are entirely derived from the market.
All three measures of support for agriculture are highly correlated
within countries and correlated across countries, both in aggregate and by
commodity. In the main regression speciﬁcations discussed in this paper,
we measure support for agriculture in the OECD by commodity using the
NPC. However, our results are robust to alternative measures of support.
Figure 5.4 reports the NPC by commodity for the OECD for the periods
1986–88 and 2000–2. Milk, sugar, and rice receive the highest levels of
production-distorting support.
In order to estimate equations (1) and (2), we must identify which OECD
support policies are relevant to country i in period t by matching support
policies to countries in a way that reﬂects the relative importance of sup-
port by commodity for each country. That is, for a non-OECD country i,
we must identify a set of weights to use to combine measures of the NPC
for the following products: wheat, maize, rice, other grains, oilseeds, sugar,
milk, beef, sheep meat, wool, pig meat, poultry, and eggs. These are the
products for which the NPC is calculated by the OECD and USDA. We
must also appropriately account for the fact that countries produce other
agricultural products for which the NPC is equal to one.
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13. The percent PSE has several potential shortcomings when considering how it might be
used in econometric analysis (Masters 1993; Wise 2004). It is possible that total support for
agricultural producers as measured by the PSE could be increased by policy changes, while
the distortionary eﬀects of support are reduced by changes in the policy mix used to support
agriculture (e.g., if export subsidies were replaced with decoupled income or production sup-
port). This is because the PSE is made up of several categories of transfers that have diﬀering
impacts on production, consumption, and trade. Thus, the most common measure of support
may not be the most appropriate for our analysis; we do not expect policies that do not aﬀect
trade to impact developing countries.We create the variable OECDPOLICY as a weighted average of support
provided by rich-country governments to growers of these products (or
similar commodities that are likely substitutes for it) in each year for the
period 1982–2000, where weights are deﬁned by the share of each product
in the developing country’s agricultural output in 1970.14 This approach
should avoid the problem that current production choices are partly deter-
mined by current subsidy levels. In addition, some African countries have
severely discriminated against agriculture in the past; we want to consider
their potential exports (as measured by their sectoral structure in 1970)
rather than their actual exports or production. For commodities that have
a calculated NPC we use FAO data on 1970 total production of the fol-
lowing products: wheat, maize, rice, other grains (calculated as total cere-
als less wheat, maize, and rice), oilseeds (including cake and meal), sugar
(reﬁned, cane, and beet), milk (condensed, dry, and fresh), beef and veal,
sheep meat (fresh), wool (greasy), pig meat, poultry meat, and eggs. For
vegetables and melons, all roots and tubers, all ﬁbers, coﬀee, cocoa, and all
fruits, we set the NPC equal to one.15
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Fig. 5.4 Producer nominal protection coeﬃcients by commodity
14. Ideally, this approach would use developing-country agricultural sectoral composition
in 1930—before the architecture of modern OECD farm policy was put in place. Data from
this period may be of poor quality, however, to the extent that they exist.
15. By assuming an NPC of one for ﬁbers we underestimate the value of OECDPOLICY
for cotton producers. Even excluding cotton, bound tariﬀs for these products are not uni-
formly equal to zero in developed countries. Thus, our approach underestimates OECD-
POLICY. However, tariﬀs for these products are much lower than bound tariﬀs for so-called
program crops and those commodities for which the OECD calculates an NPC. There are also
relatively few megatariﬀs for these products. For example, the World Trade Organization
(WTO) bound tariﬀs reported by the United States include nineteen tariﬀs of 100 percent or
higher. Only six of these are for products for which we assume an NPC of one, and these are
minor products in the nuts and tobacco commodity group.African countries, which have a relatively large fraction of historical
agricultural production in roots and tubers and in coﬀee and cocoa, tend
to have low levels of OECDPOLICY. Small countries that import essen-
tially all their food needs also have low values of OECDPOLICY. Con-
versely, rice producers have high values of OECDPOLICY. Grain and oil-
seed exporters, such as Brazil, tend to have values of OECDPOLICY that
fall in the middle of the distribution.
We note in table 5.1 the countries included in our regression analysis—
a subset of the countries included in ﬁgures 5.1 through 5.3. Our largest
sample includes seventy-ﬁve developing countries for the period 1982–
2001. We also identify the countries that are members of the Cairns Group,
currently considered to be among the most competitive agricultural export-
ers. Far more countries in our sample are net food and cereal import-
ers than exporters, which is consistent with our discussion in section 5.2
ofthe experience of a larger sample of developing countries. Notably, how-
ever, the Cairns Group countries are not all historical exporters; Bolivia,
Chile, and Indonesia were net importers of food and cereals in the 1970s,
for example.
Our data on income per capita, measured in 1996 PPP dollars, come
from the Penn World Tables, version 6.1. To control for global weather
shocks that impact commodity prices we use a common measure of the El
Niño–Southern Oscillation (ENSO) severity called the Southern Oscilla-
tion Index (SOI) anomaly.16 Recent research has shown that ENSO sever-
ity can explain as much as 20 percent of annual commodity price variation
(Brunner 2002). There is also a positive correlation between ENSO, as
measured by the SOI anomaly, and GDP growth. Thus, we expect the co-
eﬃcient on this variable to be positive.
Table 5.2 reports summary statistics for all of the variables used to esti-
mate equations (1) and (2). We report these statistics for the entire sample
and then separately for the Cairns Group and for historical food im-
porters.17 We deﬁne countries that were food and cereal exporters or im-
porters based on data for the 1970s, the decade prior to our analysis. Food-
importing countries have higher average incomes than the Cairns Group
food exporters because several well-oﬀ island countries (e.g., Hong Kong
and Singapore) are food importers. However, the variance of incomes in
the Cairns Group is signiﬁcantly lower among food importers. None of the
poorest countries in the sample are in this group. These patterns are stable
across the two decades that we consider.
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16. The SOI anomaly measures deviations between air pressure diﬀerentials in the South
Paciﬁc and historical averages. For each year, we take the average of the SOI anomaly as mea-
sured in January and June. These data are available from the National Oceanic and Atmos-
pheric Administration (NOAA).
17. In table 5.2 and in the regression analysis, Bolivia, Chile, and Indonesia are included only
in the Cairns Group sample. They are not included in the historical food-importers sample.Because our speciﬁcation includes country dummies, our measures of
a country’s own policies were chosen to reﬂect trade and macro policies
that vary signiﬁcantly over time within countries. Therefore, the variables
we use to control for own-country policies are trade share (exports plus
imports divided by GDP) and inﬂation. Table 5.2 shows that the Cairns
Group countries are richer than the rest of the countries in the sample.
They also have a signiﬁcantly smaller share of the population below the
poverty line. The trade share of GDP is actually lower for the Cairns
Group, which is likely to be explained by the diﬀerences in GDP. OECD-
POLICY is slightly higher for the Cairns Group, implying that these coun-
tries are slightly more vulnerable to OECD subsidies. The rate of inﬂation
in the Cairns Group is nearly double that in the rest of the sample. This is
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Table 5.2 Summary statistics for cross-country regressions
No. of  Standard 
observations Mean deviation Minimum Maximum
A. All developing countries in pooled cross section 1982–2001
Head count poverty rate ($1/day, PPP $1985) 225 20.23 20.61 0.00 87.67
Income per capita (PPP $1985) 1,485 3,357 3,098 341 20,591
OECDNPC 1,503 1.57 0.48 0.99 3.64
Log consumer price index 1,377 0.19 0.43 –0.12 4.77
Exports   imports/GDP 1,461 0.68 0.39 0.06 2.95
B. Cairns Group in pooled cross section 1982–2001
Head count poverty rate ($1/day, PPP $1985) 72 9.85 8.87 0.00 47.04
Income per capita (PPP $1985) 281 4,105 1,702 1,580 8,724
OECDNPC 281 1.80 0.45 1.17 3.20
Log consumer price index 281 0.31 0.63 –0.01 4.77
Exports   imports/GDP 281 0.56 0.35 0.12 2.29
C. Cereal and food importers in pooled cross section 1982–2001
Head count poverty rate ($1/day, PPP $1985) 74 24.20 26.11 0.00 87.67
Income per capita (PPP $1985) 613 3,834 4,065 437 20,591
OECDNPC 621 1.52 0.52 0.99 3.64
Log consumer price index 554 0.14 0.30 –0.12 4.33
Exports   imports/GDP 591 0.71 0.44 0.16 2.95
D. Other developing countries in pooled cross section 1982–2001
Head count poverty rate ($1/day, PPP $1985) 85 25.41 18.58 0.00 72.29
Income per capita (PPP $1985) 611 2,500 2,064 341 11,783
OECDNPC 621 1.55 0.45 1.01 3.30
Log consumer price index 562 0.17 0.39 –0.10 4.64
Exports   imports/GDP 609 0.71 0.32 0.06 1.59
Source: World Development Indicators (trade share and CPI), Penn World Tables (income), and World
Bank PovertyNet (head count), FAOSTAT, and SourceOECD (OECDNPC).
Notes: Cereal and food importers deﬁned as countries that had negative values of net exports of cereals
and food on average in 1970s. The average Southern Oscillation Index anomaly has an average value of
–0.58 (standard deviation 1.18).because nine of the fourteen Cairns Group countries are in Latin America,
where inﬂation has been notoriously problematic.
5.3.3 Results
Tables 5.3 and 5.4present the results of estimating equations (1) and (2),
respectively. In both tables, the estimates are separated into three panels.
Panel A presents results for the entire sample. There is good reason to be-
lieve that the coeﬃcient on OECDPOLICY will vary across countries.
Speciﬁcally, the eﬀect of changes in commodity prices on poverty (income)
is likely to depend on whether a country is a net importer or net exporter
of the product in question. Therefore, in panels B and C we relax the as-
sumption of a constant elasticity of poverty (income) with respect to
OECD policy. In panel B we estimate equations (1) and (2) for members of
the Cairns Group, and in panel C we estimate these equations for countries
that are historical net food importers.
We begin by looking at the results of the estimation of equation (1) for
the entire sample. The regressions in columns (1) and (2) report the simple
correlation between OECDPOLICY and poverty. In column (1) we con-
trol only for country ﬁxed eﬀects; in column (2) we add time ﬁxed eﬀects.
In columns (3) through (6) we add a measure of average income and a mea-
sure of weather ﬂuctuations, and in columns (5) and (6) we add two mea-
sures of domestic policy: trade as a share of GDP and the log of inﬂation.
The only robust result across speciﬁcations is the relationship between av-
erage income and poverty documented by Besley and Burgess (2003).
Imposing the assumption of a constant elasticity across countries is one
reason that we might not ﬁnd any relationship between OECD policy and
poverty. We check this by estimating equation (1) separately in panel B for
the Cairns Group, the group of countries pushing for agricultural liberal-
ization and most expected to beneﬁt from agricultural liberalization. The
results in panel B are not much diﬀerent from those in panel A. We turn
next to the group of countries expected to lose as a result of higher food
prices, historical food importers. Once again, the coeﬃcient on OECD pol-
icy is insigniﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. For this subsample of countries,
reducing inﬂation is associated with poverty reduction.
Why do we ﬁnd no relationship between OECD policy and poverty? The
most obvious explanation is the lack of data. Our entire sample consists of
a little over 200 observations for most countries because the poverty data
are only available for two or three years. We can partially address this issue
by redeﬁning our dependent variable to be average income per capita. To
obtain the link between OECD policy and poverty, we can then rely on the
link between average income and poverty documented by Besley and
Burgess (2003) and evident in our table 5.3.
Table 5.4 reports the results of estimating equation (2). In panel A we re-
port estimates for the whole sample. As in table 5.3, there is no evidence of
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
A. All developing countries
Ln OECDPOLICY 0.140 2.439 3.036 3.036 2.203 2.120
(0.885) (1.684) (1.446)∗∗ (1.746) (1.544) (1.691)
Ln GDP per capita –4.300 –4.300 –5.093 –5.135
(2.104)∗∗ (2.104)∗∗ (2.426)∗∗ (2.487)∗∗
SOI anomaly –0.326 –0.291 –0.291
(0.155)∗∗ (0.169) (0.168)




No. of observations 223 223 217 217 211 211
R2 0.67 0.69 0.72 0.72 0.73 0.73
B. Cairns Group only
Ln OECDPOLICY 1.307 1.427 1.346 1.346 0.931 0.464
(1.781) (1.693) (0.976) (0.976) (1.081) (1.361)
Ln GDP per capita –3.570 –3.570 –3.590 –3.766
(3.148) (3.148) (3.189) (3.142)






No. of observations 70 70 69 69 69 69
R2 0.55 0.67 0.69 0.69 0.69 0.70
C. Historical food-importers only
Ln OECDPOLICY –1.372 1.448 1.130 1.130 0.471 0.512
(1.254) (2.163) (2.776) (2.776) (2.678) (2.586)
Ln GDP per capita –4.154 –4.154 –4.816 –4.842
(2.088)∗∗ (2.088)∗∗ (2.031)∗∗∗ (2.069)∗∗∗
SOI anomaly 0.715 0.739 0.686
(0.643) (0.619) (0.563)




No. of observations 74 74 74 74 72 72
R2 0.83 0.88 0.91 0.91 0.92 0.92
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. All estimates include country ﬁxed eﬀects. Es-
timates in columns (2)–(6) also include year dummies.
∗∗∗Signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level.
∗∗Signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.any robust relationship between OECD policy and average income per
capita in developing countries. We do ﬁnd that good weather has a small
eﬀect on average income (as previously documented by Brunner 2002). In
panel B of table 5.4 we present the same sequence of regression results for the
smaller sample of Cairns Group countries. Recall that some of these coun-
tries were actually food importers in the 1970s. These are the countries for
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Table 5.4 Income and OECD agricultural support: Cross-country evidence
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
A. All developing countries
Ln OECDPOLICY 0.102 0.136 0.136 0.131 0.128
(0.043)∗∗ (0.082) (0.082) (0.085) (0.082)
SOI anomaly 0.033 0.033 0.030
(0.012)∗∗∗ (0.012)∗∗∗ (0.013)∗∗




No. of observations 1,410 1,410 1,410 1,299 1,282
R2 0.97 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98
B. Cairns Group only
Ln OECDPOLICY 0.176 0.469 0.469 0.462 0.323
(0.117) (0.256) (0.256) (0.255) (0.243)
SOI anomaly 0.015 0.016 0.018
(0.041) (0.042) (0.042)




No. of observations 267 267 267 267 267
R2 0.87 0.94 0.94 0.94 0.94
C. Historical food importers
Ln OECDPOLICY 0.123 0.168 0.168 0.204 0.213
(0.060)∗∗ (0.090) (0.090) (0.101) (0.113)
SOI anomaly 0.036 0.023 0.018
(0.016)∗∗ (0.011)∗∗∗ (0.013)




No. of observations 582 582 582 524 507
R2 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. All estimates include country ﬁxed eﬀects. Es-
timates in columns (2)–(5) also include year dummies.
∗∗∗Signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level.
∗∗Signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.which we predict a negative correlation between OECDPOLICY and in-
come per capita. Again, the sign on OECDPOLICY is opposite to what we’d
predict, but the coeﬃcient is so imprecisely measured that we cannot distin-
guish it from zero. We examine the impact of OECDPOLICY on historical
food importers in panel C. This is the group for which we predicted a posi-
tive relationship between OECDPOLICY and income per capita. The sign
on OECDPOLICY is as predicted, but again the result is insigniﬁcantly dis-
tinguishable from zero in all but one instance. There is a dichotomy between
the Cairns Group sample and the historical food importers in that trade
share is positively correlated with income for the Cairns Group but has no
relationship to income for the historical food importers. By contrast, inﬂa-
tion is negatively correlated with income for historical food importers and
does not appear to matter for the Cairns Group countries.
5.3.4 Discussion
In summary, we ﬁnd no evidence in our regression analysis that—on aver-
age—OECD policies help or hurt the poor. Several caveats are in order. First,
for each country, we are looking at a package of policies that includes all of
the products produced by the developing country. It is possible for a country
to be a net exporter of one commodity and a net importer of a second com-
modity, both of which are subsidized by the OECD countries. The eﬀects of
a price decline would have diﬀerent eﬀects in the diﬀerent sectors, and we are
unable to capture this in our current framework, which focuses on aggregate
eﬀects. Second, looking at average income might be misleading if—as many
of the advocates for the poor suggest—the poor are the net sellers of these
products and the relatively well-oﬀare the net consumers of these same prod-
ucts. In this case, OECD policy, by depressing commodity prices, could make
the poor worse oﬀand the rich better oﬀ, leaving average income unchanged.
We would capture this in our poverty regressions, but, as we mentioned, these
data are sparse. Finally, the poverty data are likely to include government
transfers in some cases and not in others. This is problematic because it makes
it diﬃcult to isolate the impact of OECD policy on poverty.
5.4 Do U.S. Corn Subsidies Hurt Poor Mexican Corn Farmers?
In this section of the paper, we evaluate the claim that U.S. support to
corn farmers—by depressing Mexican producer prices—has been largely
responsible for the increase in rural poverty in Mexico.18 We begin by doc-
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18. For example, in a recent policy brief Oxfam (2003) argues that NAFTA has been
responsible for a surge in U.S. corn exports to Mexico and the associated decline in the real
producer price of corn. Moreover, the brief argues that Mexican corn farmers are at a distinct
disadvantage vis-à-vis U.S. corn farmers because of the huge subsidies paid out by the U.S.
government. The result of this ﬂood of cheap U.S. imports has been an increase in poverty of
the 15 million Mexicans who depend on corn as a source of income.umenting the decline in the Mexican producer price of corn. Next we con-
sider the reasons for this decline: was it primarily Mexican policy or U.S.
policy? We also consider the possibility that the majority of corn farmers
living far from the border in states like Chiapas are sheltered from changes
in the world price of corn. Finally, we analyze the impact of the decline in
producer prices on Mexican corn farmers and their families.
Mexican corn is an ideal case study for our purposes for a number of rea-
sons. Mexico is an importer of corn and has been for several decades. Corn
is also a product heavily subsidized by the OECD countries and in partic-
ular the United States, a major trading partner of Mexico. We have na-
tional employment surveys and household data that include detailed in-
formation on corn expenditures and sources of income, including income
received in the form of government transfers. These data are available for
the period 1990–2000—the period over which the real Mexican producer
price of corn declined by more than 50 percent. Thus, we can learn a great
deal about the impact of depressed commodity prices on the poor by study-
ing the case of Mexico. We also have time series data on regional producer
prices and reference prices that allow us to explore the determinants of the
decline in producer prices, including the extent to which producer prices
move with world prices. We rely on existing work that examines the link be-
tween world corn prices and U.S. corn subsidies to estimate the relative im-
portance of U.S. corn subsidies as a determinant of the Mexican producer
price of corn.
As we discussed extensively in the ﬁrst half of this paper, the impact of a
price decline on poverty depends on whether the poor are net buyers or net
sellers of the commodity in question. This is as true for households as it is
for countries, but it has largely been ignored in discussions of the impact
of corn trade liberalization on Mexico (see, for example, Nadal 2001 and
World Bank 2004).19
Using nationally representative survey data for the years 1991 through
2000, we study the actual impact of a reduction in the price of corn on
poverty among corn farmers in Mexico. Like de Janvry, Sadoulet, and
Gordillo de Anda (1995), we are interested in identifying net sellers of
corn. Because detailed data on income and expenditure are not recorded
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19. Two papers written prior to the implementation of NAFTA do consider the possibility
that poor Mexican corn farmers might actually be net consumers of corn. Using household
survey data from 1990 for three states in Mexico, de Janvry, Sadoulet, and Gordillo de Anda
(1995) ﬁnd that the majority of small and medium-sized corn producers do not produce for
the market. They predict therefore that most corn farmers’ income will not be directly aﬀected
by the decline in the price of corn associated with NAFTA, while a signiﬁcant share will ben-
eﬁt as consumers. Using a general equilibrium framework, Levy and van Wijnbergen (1995)
quantify the impact on household welfare, the labor market, and the land market of liberal-
izing the Mexican corn sector. This paper makes the important point that even subsistence
farmers who do not sell corn are likely to sell labor. Thus, to the extent that the drop in corn
prices reduces rural wages, subsistence farmers are likely to be hurt by the liberalization of the
corn sector.in the same survey, making it diﬃcult to identify households that are net
sellers, we use information from the National Employment Survey to doc-
ument over time by measures of living standard (size of land holdings) the
share of corn farmers who report that they sell corn and the changes in
these farmers’ income. This exercise allows us to determine the share of the
poorest corn farmers whose income has been directly aﬀected by changes
in the price of corn because they sell corn.
Of course, even if individual farmers’ earnings from corn farming have
fallen, it could be that total household expenditures on corn products have
fallen by even more, in which case the household to which the corn farmer
belongs would be a net beneﬁciary of the reduction in the price of corn.
Since the National Employment Survey only tracks income from the re-
spondents’ primary job, we use household survey data to document, by
measures of living standard, changes in income and expenditure on corn
products of families with family members who report that their primary or
secondary source of income is corn farming. While the household survey
does not speciﬁcally ask for the amount of income derived from corn farm-
ing, it does ask whether the household members’ primary source of income
is corn farming. In addition, the survey asks each individual member of the
household whether their income is derived from labor (work income), from
business (proﬁt income), from remittances both domestic and interna-
tional (income from remittances), from government programs (income
from transfers), or from other sources, such as rental income (other in-
come). For those households that report that their primary source of in-
come is corn farming, the work and proﬁt share of income reported is de-
rived primarily from corn farming. Thus, a comparison between changes
in income and changes in expenditure on corn products allows us to deter-
mine whether households that rely on corn farming as a primary or sec-
ondary source of income (and in particular the poorest corn farmers) have
on net beneﬁted from a reduction in the price of corn.20
To determine the relative impact of domestic policy and international
policy on the producer price of corn, we examine the extent to which U.S.
subsidies have depressed Mexican producer prices, and we study the pat-
tern of corn prices across time and across states. Our primary goal here is
to determine the reason for the dramatic decline in the producer price of
corn over the period 1986–2002. First, we consider the impact of domestic
policy (“my policies”) on the producer price by comparing Mexican pro-
ducer prices to border prices pre- and post-1994, the year the North Amer-
ican Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) between Canada, Mexico, and the
United States was signed. We focus on NAFTA because it marks the be-
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20. One complication that we do not address is the fact that corn is purchased in many
diﬀerent forms. Thus, it is harder to argue that the expenditure patterns are attributable solely
or even primarily to NAFTA.ginning of the liberalization of the corn market. Importantly, NAFTA en-
compasses both policies designed to align Mexican producer prices with
world prices (such as tariﬀ liberalization) and domestic policies designed
to soften the negative consequences of this liberalization. We extend this
analysis to a comparison of prices at the state level to determine whether—
as some claim—states farthest from the border have been shielded from
trade liberalization. To obtain an estimate of the impact of U.S. subsidies
on border prices, or how much higher border price would be in the absence
of U.S. subsidies (“your policies”), we rely on a recent survey of this issue
by Wise (2004).
One important caveat is in order. Our data do not track the same house-
holds over time, and therefore we are unable to document what has hap-
pened to the income of farmers and households who relied heavily on corn
farming prior to liberalization and who then switched out of corn farming
into some other activity. To understand whether in fact our results suﬀer
from a serious selection bias, we examine farmer (and corn-farming house-
hold) characteristics over time to determine whether these have changed
substantially. In future work, we will use regression analysis and correct for
selection bias.
The remainder of this case study is organized as follows. We ﬁrst de-
scribe the policy environment in Mexico. Next we assess the relative im-
portance of “my policies” (NAFTA) or “your policies” (U.S. corn subsi-
dies) in determining the Mexican producer price of corn. We then consider
the impact of these policies on poverty among Mexican corn farmers. We
conclude with outstanding issues and directions for future research.
5.4.1 The Policy Environment in Mexico
This section of the paper is devoted to describing the package of policies
known as NAFTA. The critics claim that NAFTA has exposed poor Mex-
ican corn farmers to cheap U.S. imports. However, it is important to re-
member that NAFTA included several policy reforms beyond the removal
of tariﬀs. It is also worth noting that NAFTA was freely agreed to by the
Mexican government and thus should be counted among “my policies” in
the parlance of this paper.
Since the implementation of NAFTA, tariﬀs on imported corn have
been dramatically reduced. The Mexican over-quota bound tariﬀ on corn
has been reduced from 206.4 percent to 72.6 percent, and the tariﬀ-rate
quota (TRQ) has increased from 2.5 million metric tons to 3.36 million
metric tons. At the same time, Mexico has converted its import licensing
system to a transitional TRQ that will remain eﬀective until 2008 with a 3
percent annual increase in quantity. Over the ﬁrst six years of the agree-
ment, an aggregate 24 percent of the tariﬀ was eliminated. The remainder
will be phased out by 2008.
NAFTA included several policy reforms beyond the removal of tariﬀs
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directly aﬀected corn farmers are the removal of price supports and the im-
plementation of direct income transfers. Other reforms that would have
had an impact on corn farmers are an extension program aimed at raising
productivity, changes in credit, and land reform. We discuss each of these
below, drawing on a recent evaluation of the eﬀect of NAFTA on Mexico’s
agricultural sector (Yunez-Naude and Barceinas Paredes 2002).
According to Yunez-Naude and Barceinas Paredes (2002), it is widely
agreed that the most important domestic policy reform has been the elim-
ination of price supports to producers of basic crops. The producer price
of corn was supported through government procurement by CONASUPO
(the National Basic Foods Company). The 1991 nominal rate of protection
to corn was 77 percent, and the producer subsidy equivalent (PSE)
amounted to $92 per tonne for white corn and $71 per tonne for yellow
corn, compared to $28 in the United States and $21 in Canada. Consumer
prices were also subsidized, but mainly for urban consumers through ac-
cess to CONASUPO stores. In these government-run stores, consumers
could purchase cheaper corn that the government had acquired from pro-
ducers at inﬂated prices. However, few farmers live close enough to such
stores to sell corn at the high support price and then buy their consump-
tion needs at the low subsidized prices (de Janvry, Sadoulet, and Gordillo
de Anda 1995).
CONASUPO’s role in the corn market was substantially diminished in
1995 as a result of the Mexican peso crisis. The peso devaluation in 1995
allowed the Zedillo government to transform CONASUPO into a buyer of
last resort and eliminate price supports to corn farmers. However, because
of the drop in corn prices in 1996, the government of Mexico reinstated an
intermediate scheme of price ﬁxing whereby prices were ﬁxed on a regional
basis at a level between the guaranteed price and the international price.
This scheme was abolished in 1999.21
Some Mexican corn producers currently receive a ﬁxed subsidy per ton
of marketable surplus under the Marketing Support Program. In order to
participate in this program, producers must have a marketable surplus.
Relatively few farmers (around 10 percent) ﬁt this description (Zahniser
and Coyle 2004). PROCAMPO was initiated in the winter of 1993–94, a
few months before the beginning of NAFTA. The program was designed
to supplement farmers’ income and moved support in the direction of in-
come transfers. Payments were based on area under cultivation. Its main
purpose was to help farmers facing stiﬀ competition from U.S. and Cana-
dian farmers make a transition to more competitive crops. It is intended to
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21. CONASUPO also subsidized tortilla processors and maize millers by selling to these
processors the maize purchased from farmers at a price that would allow the processors a
“reasonable” proﬁt.last until 2008, when full trade liberalization under NAFTA will be com-
plete.
There are several other reforms that took place during the 1990s not spe-
ciﬁcally aimed at corn farmers but that would nevertheless impact them.
The ﬁrst is the Alliance for the Countryside (Alianza para el Campo). It in-
cludes PROCAMPO as well as other programs. One of the most important
programs is PRODUCE, which is an extension program designed to in-
crease productivity via improved technology. Liberalization of the agricul-
tural sector also entailed the elimination of subsidized inputs such as seeds
fertilizer and credit. Finally, the Salinas government amended the consti-
tution in 1991 to liberalize property rights in the ejidal sector. Until this
time, peasants who beneﬁted from land redistribution, ejidatarios, were by
law not allowed to associate, rent, or sell their land. The constitutional
amendment abolished this provision and is expected to develop rural land
markets by allowing farmers to participate in private credit markets and by
promoting direct investment.
Based on the preceding discussion, it should now be clear that when we
refer to NAFTA we are not simply referring to a removal of tariﬀs on im-
ported corn. NAFTA was much broader than that. In what follows, we use
NAFTA to represent domestic policy changes (“my policies”) that impact
the Mexican producer price of corn.
5.4.2 What Determines the Mexican Producer Price of Corn:
My Policies or Yours?
There is no doubt that NAFTA is having an impact on United States–
Mexico corn trade. Figure 5.5conﬁrms the ﬁndings of others that U.S. corn
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Fig. 5.5 U.S. corn exports to Mexico
Source: USDA (www.//www.ers.usda.gov/Brieﬁng/Corn/trade.htm).exports to Mexico (the United States is the only country that exports sig-
niﬁcant amounts of corn to Mexico) have increased dramatically since the
signing of NAFTA.22 Moreover, prior to NAFTA, the United States ex-
ported virtually no white corn—the type of corn typically grown by Mex-
ican corn farmers—to Mexico. However, as ﬁgure 5.5 shows, the amounts
of both yellow and white corn exported from the United States to Mexico
increased substantially after the signing of NAFTA.23 As a share of Mexi-
can corn production, U.S. imports increased from an average of 8.4 percent
of total production in the eight years leading up to NAFTA to an average
of 32.6 percent of total production in the eight years following NAFTA.
Figure 5.6 shows that the average real price paid to producers of corn in
Mexico dropped signiﬁcantly between 1986 and 2002. Part of the drop in
Mexican producer prices has to do with the drop in the world price of corn;
the Mexican producer price follows fairly closely the border price. In ﬁgure
5.6 we plot the annual average Mexican producer price in real 1994 pesos
against the annual average border price, also reported in real 1994 pesos.
The border price was obtained from the OECD’s PSE database (http://
www.oecd.org/dataoecd/33/54/32361406.xls) and reﬂects the cost of im-
porting U.S. corn at the border, including freight charges to the border but
not within Mexico. U.S. dollars are converted to pesos using an annual av-
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22. See, for example, Zahniser and Coyle (2004).
23. The distinction between yellow corn and white corn is an important one. Mexican corn
farmers primarily grow white corn, which is used to make food products. Yellow corn is typ-
ically used to feed animals. However, there is some substitutability between yellow and white
corn. Food-grade yellow corn is used to make cornﬂakes, tortilla chips, beer, and other foods,
and white corn can be used as animal feed (Zahniser and Coyle 2004).
Fig. 5.6 Corn producer prices and world prices
Source: OECD Producer Support Estimate database.erage of the oﬃcial exchange rate. Both series are converted to 1994 pesos
using the national consumer price index.
There are two important pieces of evidence to take away from ﬁgure 5.6.
First, although the two price series moved closely together throughout the
1990s, 1996 was an exception. In 1996, the two series diverge as U.S. prices
increase and Mexican prices drop. Indeed, in 1996 Mexican producers
were actually taxed, and were receiving only 88 percent of the U.S. price for
their product. Thereafter, the two series continue to move closely together.
Second, prior to NAFTA, the gap between the Mexican price and the U.S.
price is signiﬁcantly greater than the gap post-NAFTA. Indeed, the aver-
age NPC (the ratio of the Mexican producer price to the border price) for
the period 1986–95 is 1.61, while the average NPC for the period 1996–
2002 is 1.17.24
We test the patterns suggested by ﬁgure 5.6 more formally in a regression
framework and report these results in tables 5.5 and 5.6. For U.S. prices, we
use the same price series shown in ﬁgure 5.6. For Mexican producer prices,
we now use a separate price series for each of Mexico’s thirty-two states.
Our time series covers only 1991–2000 since these are the years for which
we have price data at the state level. Also in tables 5.5 and 5.6, we explore
the possibility that states further from the border, where the poorest corn
farmers live, are less aﬀected by changes in world prices and NAFTA. Fol-
lowing Nicita (2004), we assign states to four groups depending on their
distance from the U.S. border.25
Table 5.5 presents the results of regressions of the real Mexican producer
price for each state on real border prices. To eliminate the common time
trend, we ﬁrst diﬀerence both price series. In column (1) we report the re-
sults of the simple correlation between Mexican and U.S. prices. Not sur-
prisingly, the correlation is positive. In column (2) we test whether this re-
lationship has changed signiﬁcantly as a result of NAFTA. The weak and
negative sign on the interaction term is counterintuitive and suggests that
the relationship between Mexican and U.S. prices weakened after NAFTA.
However, in column (3), we introduce a control for the sudden shift in pol-
icy in 1996 and ﬁnd that the coeﬃcients on the NAFTA terms are now in-
signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. We interpret this as evidence that, except
in 1996, Mexican and U.S. prices moved closely together both before and
after NAFTA. In column (4), we restrict the sample by dropping 1996 and
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24. The results are even more pronounced if we do not include 1995 in the pre-NAFTA av-
erage.
25. Border states are Baja California, Sonora, Chihuahua, Coahuila, Nuevo Leon, and
Tamaulipas. Northern states are Sinaloa, Nayarit, Zacatecas, Aguascalientes, San Luis Po-
tosi, and Durango. Central states are Jalisco, Colima, Michoacan, Guanajuato, Queretaro,
Estado de Mexico, Hidalgo, Distrito Federal, Tlaxcala, Morelos, Puebla, and Veracruz.
Southern states are Guerrero, Oaxaca, Chiapas, Tabasco, Campeche, Yucatan, and Quintana
Roo.Table 5.5 Is globalization driving the trends in Mexican producer prices?
(1991–2000; dependent variable: Mexican producer price in
ﬁrst diﬀerences)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Real U.S. price 0.204 0.322 0.322 0.313
(4.00)∗∗∗ (5.40)∗∗∗ (5.37)∗∗∗ (2.22)








USPrice   North 0.068
(0.38)
USPrice   Central 0.095
(0.55)








Constant –63.912 –95.931 –95.931 –76.424
(7.38)∗∗∗ (8.86)∗∗∗ (8.82)∗∗∗ (3.39)∗∗∗
No. of observations 224 224 224 192
R2 0.08 0.11 0.14 0.16
Notes: Robust t-statistics in parentheses. Mexican producer prices are annual by state and
were obtained from SAGARPA. They were deﬂated to real 1994 prices using the national
CPI. U.S. prices were obtained from the OECD Producer Support Estimate database and are
the c.i.f. import price of corn not including transport or processing costs from the Mexican
border to Mexican consumers. U.S. prices were converted to Mexican pesos using the annual
average oﬃcial exchange rate. Mexican and U.S. prices are in ﬁrst diﬀerences to eliminate the
common time trend. NAFTA is a dummy equal to 1 for the years 1996–2000. Results are ro-
bust to deﬁning the NAFTA dummy equal to 1 also in 1995. The omitted category is border
states. These are Baja California, Sonora, Chihuahua, Coahuila, Nuevo Leon, and Tamauli-
pas. Northern states are Sinaloa, Nayarit, Zacatecas, Aguascalientes, San Luis Potosi, and
Durango. Central states are Jalisco, Colima, Michoacan, Guanajuato, Queretaro, Estado de
Mexico, Hidalgo, Distrito Federal, Tlaxcala, Morelos, Puebla, and Veracruz. Southern states
are Guerrero, Oaxaca, Chiapas, Tabasco, Campeche, Yucatan, and Quintana Roo.
∗∗∗Signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level.
∗∗Signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.test for the possibility that Mexican prices might follow more closely the
world price in states closer to the border; we ﬁnd no evidence of this.
In table 5.6, we test whether a relaxation of tariﬀs on imported corn re-
duced the wedge between the Mexican producer price of corn and the bor-
der price. In column (1), we do this by regressing the ratio of the Mexican
price to the U.S. price on a NAFTA dummy. The results indicate that prior
to NAFTA Mexican prices were 1.62 times the U.S. price and that post-
NAFTA Mexican prices were only 1.18 times the U.S. price. These num-
bers are consistent with the simple calculations based on the annual data
used to plot ﬁgure 5.6. In column (2) we test whether this diﬀerential is any
smaller for states closer to the border and ﬁnd no evidence of this. In col-
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Table 5.6 Is globalization driving the diﬀerential between Mexican and U.S. corn











North   Nafta 0.093
(0.87)
Central   Nafta 0.069
(0.58)
South   Nafta 0.001
(0.02)
Constant 1.619 1.339 1.647
(38.82)∗∗∗ (32.49)∗∗∗ (23.01)∗∗∗
No. of observations 256 256 256
R2 0.30 0.00 0.31
Notes: Robust t-statistics in parentheses, Mexican producer prices are annual by state and
were obtained from SAGARA. U.S. prices were obtained from the OECD Producer Support
Estimate database and are the c.i.f. import price of corn not including transport or processing
costs from the Mexican border to Mexican consumers. U.S. prices were converted to Mexi-
can pesos using the annual average oﬃcial exchange rate. NAFTA is a dummy equal to 1 for
the years 1996–2000. Results are robust to deﬁning the NAFTA dummy equal to 1 also in
1995. The omitted category is border states. These are Baja California, Sonora, Chihuahua,
Coahuila, Nuevo Leon, and Tamaulipas. Northern states are Sinaloa, Nayarit, Zacatecas,
Aguascalientes, San Luis Potosi, and Durango. Central states are Jalisco, Colima, Michoa-
can, Guanajuato, Queretaro, Estado de Mexico, Hidalgo, Distrito Federal, Tlaxcala, More-
los, Puebla, and Veracruz. Southern states are Guerrero, Oaxaca, Chiapas, Tabasco,
Campeche, Yucatan, and Quintana Roo.
∗∗∗Signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level.umn (3) we test whether the diﬀerential changed more (less) in states close
to (far from) the border. Since the only term of any signiﬁcance is the
NAFTA dummy, we conclude that this is not the case.26
These results suggest that while the Mexican producer price has always
moved in tandem with the world price, NAFTA squeezed the diﬀerential
between Mexican producer prices and border prices. How much higher
would the border price be if the United States were not subsidizing corn?
Unfortunately, there is no consensus on this issue, as commodity prices are
notoriously diﬃcult to predict. However, though the estimates vary de-
pending on the methodology, the bottom line seems to be that the magni-
tude of the price diﬀerence would actually be quite small. Wise (2004) sum-
marizes these results and reports that the largest estimate of 2.9 percent
comes from a study by the International Food Policy Research Institute
(IFPRI). The smallest estimate (–3.0 percent) is from a study by the Agri-
cultural Policy Analysis Center (APAC) and implies that removing U.S.
subsidies would actually raise producer prices! In 2000, a 3 percent in-
crease in the producer price of corn would increase the poorest farmers’
monthly income by at most six pesos (Mex$6, or US$0.63).27
In summary, the sharp drop in Mexican producer prices over the period
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26. Since these results are at odds with a recent publication by the World Bank (Fiess and
Lederman 2004), we note a few diﬀerences between our study and the World Bank study. The
World Bank study performs a cointegration analysis using monthly price data at the national
level. They report that the results are unchanged if they use annual data. Like us, they ﬁnd a
high degree of comovement between U.S. prices and Mexican prices. However, unlike us, they
report that the diﬀerential between Mexican and U.S. prices is the same pre- and post-
NAFTA. They also plot their price series, but a comparison between our ﬁgure 5.6 and their
ﬁgure 4 is diﬃcult because they take logs of nominal prices whereas we plot levels of real
prices. The most confusing thing about the World Bank study is the fact that they report that
their results do not hold unless they include a dummy variable for the period 1995–97. They
justify this on the grounds that this was a period of severe drought during which Mexico im-
ported record amounts of U.S. corn. There are at least two problems with this. First, while it
is true that Mexico imported record amounts of corn in 1996, this is not the case for 1995, nor
is it the case for 1997 (see ﬁgure 5.1). Therefore, it is unclear why the dummy should take a
value of one in 1995 and 1997. Second, the dummy variable captures half the post-NAFTA
period, so to include it but not incorporate it in the constant term that the authors report to
be the price diﬀerential seems misleading.
27. Finally, we consider the possibility that the steep decline in the real producer price might
be partially due to the large devaluation of the Mexican peso in 1995. The direct eﬀect of the
devaluation would have been to oﬀset the decline in tariﬀs on imported corn, thus protecting
Mexican corn farmers. However, there are two indirect eﬀects that must be considered. First
is the inﬂation that was a by-product of the devaluation. Second is the strain on the govern-
ment budget. We note that the average rate of inﬂation over the period 1986–94 was 43 per-
cent, while the average rate of inﬂation from 1995 to 2000 was only 22 percent. Therefore, it
is diﬃcult to argue that the inﬂation was the root cause of farmers’ problems. Additionally,
the government has continued to support corn farmers, albeit not directly. These programs
are expensive and have managed to keep farmers’ real income (including transfers) from
falling dramatically over the period 1990–2000. Based on this evidence, we conclude that the
change in farmers’ income from corn farming is directly tied to the changes in the price of
corn at least partially brought on by NAFTA.1990–2000 corresponds almost exactly to NAFTA’s eﬀective date. Al-
though it is possible that Mexican producer prices would be higher if the
United States did not subsidize corn, the magnitude of this eﬀect seems
small both in comparison to the eﬀect of trade liberalization and in ab-
solute terms. In addition, since there was no dramatic change in U.S. farm
policy over this period, Mexican prices would have been higher through-
out the entire period. Thus, it seems unlikely that U.S. corn subsidies are
driving poverty in Mexico unless one takes the stand that U.S. corn farm-
ers as an interest group were largely responsible for NAFTA.
5.4.3 How Did the Drop in Mexican Producer Prices 
Aﬀect Poor Corn Farmers?
In this section we turn to analyzing the distributional consequences of
the drop in producer prices that we documented in section 5.4.2. We can
think of this analysis as answering two distinct questions. The ﬁrst is the fo-
cus of this paper: who in poor countries bears the brunt of rich-country
support to agriculture? The second is the focus of this volume: how does
trade liberalization aﬀect the poor?
Data
Our data on corn farmers come from the agricultural supplement of the
Encuesta Nacional de Empleo (ENE) collected by the Instituto Nacional
de Estadística, Geografía e Informática (INEGI) in Mexico. This survey
covers 453,503 individuals in rural areas, is nationally representative, and
was undertaken in 1991, 1993, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, and 2000.
The agricultural supplement is rich in detail about crop production, land
quality and size, wages, hired labor, dwelling characteristics, and total
farm output—thus providing a detailed description of the production
side of corn farming—as well as containing demographic, employment,
and income information from the broader employment survey. This data
set has rarely been exploited, and this study is the ﬁrst, to our knowledge,
to use the ENE agricultural component to analyze welfare eﬀects on Mex-
ico’s rural sector. The data set is not a panel, as each subject is only inter-
viewed once, but is a repeated cross section. INEGI did not, however, al-
ter its sampling procedures over the years in question, so it is relatively
safe to conclude that changes we see among sectors is due to composi-
tional changes in the population, as opposed to compositional changes in
the sample.
The ENE data, however, only include income from the respondents’ pri-
mary occupation and do not include consumption data. To allow a broader
analysis of welfare, we complement the ENE data with data from the En-
cuesta Nacional de Ingresos y Gastos de los Hogares (ENIGH). This sur-
vey covers 21,117 rural households and covers the years 1992, 1994, 1996,
1998 and 2000. These data are also nationally representative repeated cross
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hold level, the survey asks for a measure of total household income and in-
come from transfers including remittances (domestic and international),
and subsidies from PROCAMPO and other government programs. At the
individual level, the survey asks each member of the household how much
he or she earns and whether these earnings are derived from wages, the in-
dividual’s own business enterprise, or other sources such as rental income.
We aggregate individual incomes by household to come up with the fol-
lowing breakdown of the household’s total income: proﬁt income, work or
labor income, income from remittances, income from transfers, and other.
In addition, the survey asks whether a household’s primary or secondary
source of income is corn farming. The survey also has a detailed con-
sumption module, which recounts household expenditure on food, includ-
ing corn and corn products, education, health, housing, clothing, and
so on.
Table 5.7 presents means of socioeconomic characteristics of the rural
population from ENE for the entire sample period. All means were com-
puted adjusting for population weights. For purposes of comparing corn
farmers with the rest of the rural population, we have divided our summary
statistics into four panels. Panel A reports statistics for all rural dwellers.
Panel B reports statistics for all rural dwellers involved in agriculture, iden-
tiﬁed as those respondents who report that the industry of their primary
occupation is agriculture. This category includes farm laborers as well as
those who own or rent the land. Panel C reports statistics for farmers,
where farmeris deﬁned as someone who takes part in agricultural activities
and owns, occupies, or rents land (as opposed to agricultural laborers). Fi-
nally, panel D reports statistics for a subset of the farmers in panel C who
report that their primary occupation is the cultivation of corn and beans.
In each panel, we report mean monthly income in real 1994 pesos. Income
is deﬁned as total household income, and the majority of respondents (97.5
percent) report that their income comes in the form of proﬁts and family
consumption. The measure of income in ENE does not include remit-
tances or transfers. We also report mean age, years of schooling, hours
worked, and total usable land occupied by the respondent. To determine
the relative importance of corn farming, we report the percent of respon-
dents in each year who claim that their primary occupation is corn
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28. For the years 1992–2000, the conceptual framework of the survey is the same. There-
fore, we are able to compare results across years. The survey is a stratiﬁed sample according
to urban and rural location, and sampling is done to ensure that households are representa-
tive of geographic clusters, with the probability of being included proportional to cluster size.
However, a comparison of national accounts data and the ENIGH survey data suggests that
up to 60 percent of income goes unreported in the ENIGH survey. However, Damian (2001)
and others report that this problem derives primarily from the diﬃculty of including the very
wealthy Mexicans in the survey. Since our analysis focuses largely on the rural poor, we be-
lieve that our results are not signiﬁcantly aﬀected by this problem (Salas 2003).Table 5.7 Means of socioeconomic characteristics of rural dwellers across time
1991 1993 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
A. All rural dwellers
No. of observations 15,216 15,017 20,861 100,411 28,967 95,321 76,441 99,901
Real income (1994 pesos) 702.75 637.66 657.29 595.91 576.26 581.80 554.01 649.50
Age 33.18 33.77 33.82 33.60 34.34 34.31 34.72 34.60
Years of schooling 4.63 4.66 5.17 5.57 5.74 5.74 5.48 5.87
Hours worked 33.94 33.94 20.94 22.33 22.97 22.52 22.80 21.90
Total land (in hectares) 0.98 0.89 0.67 0.71 0.58 0.68 0.73 0.50
Involved in agriculture 0.32 0.32 0.28 0.26 0.28 0.27 0.28 0.24
Farmer 0.14 0.14 0.11 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.09 0.09
Corn occupation 0.20 0.15 0.15 0.13 0.14 0.13 0.14 0.10
Corn subsistence 0.11 0.12 0.09 0.08 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.07
Corn selling 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01
B. Rural dwellers involved in agriculture
No. of observations 5,134 5,074 6,467 25,977 6,858 25,735 18,538 22,887
Real income (1994 pesos) 585.04 495.31 502.94 434.60 427.04 411.30 405.81 425.72
Age 35.25 35.74 35.73 35.58 36.32 36.04 36.40 36.67
Years of schooling 3.81 3.75 3.96 4.23 4.46 4.38 4.30 4.42
Hours worked 33.73 33.41 35.14 38.13 38.33 34.80 37.85 35.54
Total land (in hectares) 3.04 2.75 2.37 2.72 2.07 2.47 2.64 2.08
Corn occupation 0.63 0.46 0.54 0.50 0.49 0.48 0.50 0.40
Corn subsistence 0.35 0.36 0.32 0.30 0.26 0.29 0.29 0.27
Corn selling 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.07 0.06
C. All farmers
No. of observations 2,258 2,241 2,596 10,420 2,504 9,888 7,011 8,703
Real income (1994 pesos) 582.81 480.74 515.13 450.81 447.93 415.38 389.37 394.70
Age 46.56 47.67 46.79 47.11 48.82 48.20 47.98 48.50
Years of schooling 2.78 2.63 3.05 3.34 3.54 3.38 3.48 3.46
Hours worked 37.96 37.02 40.36 43.87 45.27 41.34 44.50 40.87
Total land (in hectares) 7.10 6.21 5.91 7.00 5.63 6.63 6.95 5.59
Corn occupation 0.62 0.46 0.64 0.59 0.60 0.60 0.61 0.54
Corn subsistence 0.81 0.82 0.80 0.76 0.72 0.78 0.75 0.73
Corn selling 0.12 0.12 0.14 0.20 0.22 0.19 0.18 0.16
D. All corn farmers
No. of observations 1,420 1,003 1,628 6,047 1,481 6,017 4,185 4,900
Real income (1994 pesos) 516.81 349.63 277.89 267.68 270.01 256.84 207.64 49.23
Age 47.85 48.73 47.35 47.58 50.11 48.97 48.50 49.23
Years of schooling 2.44 2.22 2.62 2.79 2.93 2.79 2.98 2.94
Hours worked 37.11 36.09 39.66 43.93 45.70 41.05 45.23 40.18
Total land (in hectares) 6.25 3.85 4.09 4.40 4.16 4.94 4.09 3.90
Corn occupation 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Corn subsistence 0.86 0.90 0.91 0.85 0.84 0.90 0.87 0.88
Corn selling 0.15 0.16 0.16 0.25 0.27 0.23 0.24 0.22
Source: ENE 1991–2000.
Notes: “Farmer” is deﬁned as someone who takes part in agricultural activities and owns, occupies, or
rents land (as opposed to agricultural laborer). “Corn farmer” is deﬁned as a farmer who identiﬁes his
primary occupation as the cultivation of maize and beans. “Corn subsistence” is the percentage of farm-
ers who respond that their primary crop for subsistence is maize and beans. “Corn selling” is the per-
centage of farmers who respond that their main crop for selling is corn. Medians are not reported be-
cause they are virtually identical to means.farming (Corn occupation), that their primary crop for subsistence is corn
(Corn subsistence), and that their main crop for selling is corn (Corn sell-
ing).
These data highlight several important facts. The share of rural dwellers
who consider themselves farmers has fallen from 14 percent of the rural
population in 1991 to 9 percent of the rural population in 2000. Corn farm-
ers make up 20 percent of the rural population in 1991 and only 10 percent
of the rural population in 2000. Among farmers, a majority are corn farm-
ers—although this dropped from 62 percent in 1991 to 54 percent in 2000.
Three-quarters of all farmers say they grow corn as their primary crop for
subsistence. However, very few farmers (between 12 percent and 22 per-
cent) say that corn is their primary crop for selling.
Thus, most farmers are corn farmers, and this has not changed very
much over the past ten years. This is important because it implies that there
has not been a signiﬁcant amount of diversiﬁcation into other farming ac-
tivities away from corn farming. Corn farmers have on average more land
than the average rural dweller and are poorer than other farmers and than
the rest of the population. The average real monthly income from corn
farming in 2000 was only Mex$206 (US$21.79), or US$261.48 per year.29
Finally, corn farmers also have less schooling and work longer hours than
the rest of the rural population.
Table 5.8 presents means of real household variables for families in
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29. The average annual exchange rates (Mexican pesos per dollar) beginning in 1990 are
2.84, 3.02, 3.1, 3.12, 3.39, 6.42, 7.6, 7.92, 9.15, 9.55, and 9.45.
Table 5.8 Summary statistics for families with corn farmers
1992 1994 1996 1998 2000
Real monthly corn consumption
Value (1994 pesos) 77.50 62.87 73.44 61.05 55.20
As a share of food expenditures 0.20 0.16 0.19 0.19 0.17
As a share of total expenditures 0.10 0.07 0.11 0.10 0.09
Quantity (kilograms) 16.39 15.30 16.21 15.61 17.10
Real monthly income
Income from work 221.57 228.14 209.99 172.43 179.98
Income from proﬁts 479.06 420.24 327.12 339.03 355.92
Income other 21.93 6.62 10.90 10.32 13.11
Income from transfers (other) 102.19 143.43 175.70 145.97 206.64
Income from transfers (remittances) 83.14 98.99 109.97 88.13 100.69
No. of observations 1,141,718 1,249,234 1,368,191 1,204,051 990,784
Source: ENIGH 1992–2000.
Notes: Consumption ﬁgures include corn purchases, corn produced for household’s consumption, and
in-kind payments and gifts of corn. “Corn farmer” is deﬁned as someone who reports that his or her pri-
mary occupation is the cultivation of corn and beans.which at least one individual identiﬁes his or her primary occupation as the
cultivation of corn and beans. In the top panel of table 5.9, we report real
monthly household expenditure on corn, expenditure on corn as a share of
total food expenditure, expenditure on corn as a share of total expenditure,
and the quantity of corn purchased. Corn includes corn tortillas, grain,
ﬂour, masa, and starch; corn consumption includes corn purchases, corn
produced for household consumption, and in-kind payments and gifts of
corn. There are two important aspects of these data worth mentioning.
First, we are not looking only at expenditure on corn grain but expenditure
on corn grain and all derivative products, allowing us to capture the impact
of imported grain on all of these products. In particular, our expenditure
data include corn tortillas, whose price went up sharply during the 1990s
for reasons unrelated to NAFTA. We include tortillas on the grounds that
prices would have risen even more had the price of corn grain not fallen.
Second, both our income and our expenditure data include the value of
home consumption, in-kind payments, and gifts. Therefore, the change in
consumption expenditure can be viewed as an upper bound on the increase
in real income associated with the drop in the price of corn.
In the bottom panel of table 5.8, we report total real monthly household
income as well as real monthly income derived from work (labor income),
proﬁts, government transfers, and remittances. Since the income reported
in table 5.8 is household income and the income in table 5.7 is income de-
rived from the respondents’ primary occupation or individual income, the
two numbers are not directly comparable. However, the income data from
the national employment survey (ENE) derive primarily from proﬁts and
home consumption and would fall under “income from proﬁts” at the
household level. Therefore, by comparing the national employment survey
income data with the ENIGH household survey income data we can get a
sense for both how important proﬁts from corn farming are and also how
important supplementary sources of income are to corn-farming families.
For example, in 1996 the proﬁt share of income for corn-farming families
was roughly Mex$327 per month. According to the national employment
survey data, the average real income earned from corn farming by the corn
farmer was roughly Mex$268 per month. This is equal to 82 percent of the
proﬁt share of income reported in the household data or 32 percent of the
average corn-farming families’ total real monthly income. Thus, proﬁts
from corn farming are on average the most important source of income for
families of corn farmers, but work income and income from transfers are
also important, at 23 percent and 19 percent of total income, respectively.
The means in table 5.8 reveal that—for the average corn-farming fam-
ily—aggregate corn consumption and aggregate income have not changed
remarkably between 1992 and 2000. Real monthly expenditure on corn
ﬂuctuates between Mex$77 and Mex$55 per month. The average family
spends around 19 percent of its food budget on corn products and around
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1991 1993 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
A. Small corn farmers ( 5ha land)
No. of observations 920 813 1,260 4,768 1,135 4,810 3,252 3,976
Real income (1994 pesos) 437.51 323.17 245.26 199.77 205.61 162.49 155.19 152.79
Age 46.64 48.98 46.51 46.90 49.77 48.56 48.05 48.52
Years of schooling 2.37 2.22 2.60 2.75 2.81 2.67 2.83 2.86
Hours worked 36.32 35.59 39.46 43.37 45.20 39.90 44.93 39.77
Total land (in hectares) 2.39 2.23 2.10 2.20 2.17 2.19 2.12 2.08
Corn subsistence 0.89 0.92 0.93 0.89 0.88 0.93 0.92 0.92
Corn main crop for selling 0.10 0.11 0.11 0.19 0.23 0.18 0.19 0.19
Do not produce to sell 0.67 0.77 0.73 0.65 0.68 0.68 0.63 0.63
Occasionally sell corn 0.16 0.13 0.12 0.13 0.13 0.12 0.10 0.10
Never sell corn 0.56 0.67 0.64 0.57 0.59 0.60 0.57 0.57
B. Medium corn farmers (5–15ha land)
No. of observations 387 173 288 1,010 264 948 714 731
Real income (1994 pesos) 636.55 452.16 367.47 485.34 485.46 477.46 376.56 52.52
Age 51.55 47.56 52.71 50.44 50.91 51.19 50.50 52.52
Years of schooling 2.58 1.86 2.65 2.81 3.36 2.97 3.43 3.24
Hours worked 36.59 37.74 40.83 45.50 47.54 43.71 47.05 42.53
Total land (in hectares) 8.59 8.26 8.55 8.32 8.36 8.35 8.43 8.52
Corn subsistence 0.80 0.84 0.83 0.70 0.73 0.79 0.67 0.70
Corn main crop for selling 0.27 0.31 0.39 0.46 0.42 0.41 0.47 0.37
Do not produce to sell 0.33 0.47 0.35 0.23 0.35 0.29 0.24 0.33
C. Large corn farmers ( 15ha land)
No. of observations 96 17 59 240 63 259 219 193
Real income (1994 pesos) 845.46 529.43 649.68 753.77 743.45 1,031.82 725.53 949.71
Age 48.13 48.32 52.86 50.54 55.41 48.95 50.71 53.89
Years of schooling 2.50 4.76 4.00 3.66 3.83 4.08 4.53 3.66
Hours worked 45.75 41.78 42.19 51.20 52.74 50.94 44.92 41.39
Total land (in hectares) 34.15 28.40 44.71 38.88 33.97 37.46 32.22 32.31
Corn subsistence 0.78 0.49 0.75 0.49 0.36 0.62 0.51 0.58
Corn main crop for selling 0.16 0.69 0.47 0.58 0.62 0.61 0.54 0.37
Do not produce to sell 0.25 0.14 0.13 0.19 0.15 0.16 0.14 0.18
Source: ENE 1991–2000.
Notes: “Farmer” is deﬁned as someone who takes part in agricultural activities and owns, occupies, or
rents land (as opposed to agricultural laborer). “Corn farmer” is a farmer who identiﬁes his primary oc-
cupation as the cultivation of corn and beans. “Corn subsistence” is the percentage of respondents who
answer that their main crop for subsistence is corn. “Corn main crop for selling” is the percentage of re-
spondents who answer the question “what is your main crop for selling?” as “corn.” “Do not produce to
sell” is the percentage of respondents who answer the question “what is your main crop for selling?” as
“I don’t produce to sell.” “Occupationally sell corn” is the percentage of respondents who answer the
question “how much of your subsistence crop do you sell?” with “corn.” “Never sell corn” is the per-
centage of respondents who answer they do not produce to sell when asked “what is your main crop for
selling?” but who answer “which of your subsistence crops do you sell?” with “corn.” Medians are not
reported because they are virtually identical to means.10 percent of its total budget on corn products. The average family’s real
monthly income was Mex$907 (US$292) in 1992 and Mex$856 (US$90.58)
in 2000. Note that, to the extent that these families purchase imported prod-
ucts, the peso values understate the drop in real income.
While expenditure on corn did not change signiﬁcantly following
NAFTA for the average corn-farming family, there has been a marked
change in the composition of income. In 1992 the proﬁt share of income
was roughly 53 percent, and this fell to around 39 percent in 2000. The
work share of income also fell from around 24 percent in 1992 to around
20 percent in 2000. The drop in these two sources of income was largely
oﬀset by an increase in income from transfers (11 percent in 1992 and 23
percent in 2000).
In the next two sections, we examine the data from the national employ-
ment surveys (ENE) and the household surveys (ENIGH) on corn farmers
and families with corn farmers by standard of living, as measured by land
holdings. Our primary goal is to determine how the drop in the price of
corn has impacted the poorest corn farmers and the poorest corn-farming
families in Mexico.
Results from the National Employment Surveys (ENE)
Here we analyze in more detail the subgroup of the rural population
comprising those who identify themselves as corn farmers. Recall that
these are individuals who own, occupy, or rent land (as opposed to agri-
cultural laborers) and who claim that their primary occupation is the cul-
tivation of maize and beans. We recognize that farm laborers are an im-
portant group of rural dwellers whose wages are likely to be aﬀected by
changes in the price of corn. We do not attempt to consider the welfare of
these individuals here. Rather, our goal is to determine how the drop in the
price of corn aﬀected the poorest corn farmers in Mexico. To do this, we di-
vide corn farmers into three groups—small, medium, and large—depend-
ing upon the size of each farmer’s land. We then determine whether a ma-
jority of the poorest corn farmers, those with the smallest land holdings,
are net buyers or net sellers of corn.
Table 5.9 reports corn farmer characteristics by total land holding across
time.30 The mean landholding of the smallest corn farmers (those with less
than 5 ha [hectares] of land) is roughly 2 ha. This corresponds to the aver-
age land held by the poorest corn farmers identiﬁed by de Janvry, Sadoulet,
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30. The advantages of splitting the sample based on landholding are that we do not have to
worry about measurement issues associated with income and that we can directly compare
our results to those of others who also classify corn farmers by landholding. In appendix table
5A.2, we report income-based, monthly per capita measures of poverty. By Mexican stan-
dards, only our average small corn farmer is classiﬁed as extremely poor. The medium corn
farmers earn enough monthly income from corn farming to place them above both the ex-
treme poverty line and the moderate or asset-based poverty line. However, in 2000, by inter-
national standards, the medium corn farmers would be considered moderately poor.and Gordillo de Anda (1995) as “non-participants in the market” and by
Levy and van Wijnbergen (1995) as “subsistence” farmers, who primarily
farm rain-fed land. The mean landholding of the medium-sized corn farm-
ers (those with between 5 and 15 ha of land) is roughly 8.5 hectares. The
mean landholding of the largest corn farmers (those with more than 15 ha
of land) is roughly 35 ha. For small, medium, and large corn farmers we
report means of real income, age, years of schooling, hours worked, and
landholding over time. In addition, we report the percent of the population
who say that their main crop for subsistence is corn (Corn subsistence), the
percent of the population who say that their main crop for selling is corn
(Corn main crop for selling), and the percent of the population who say
that they do not produce a crop to sell in the market (Do not produce to
sell).31
For the poorest farmers (those with less than 5 ha of land), we report sta-
tistics for two additional variables. We do this because we are concerned
that the poorest farmers (often called subsistence farmers) may occasion-
ally sell corn but nevertheless report that they do not produce corn with the
intent of selling. To determine the extent to which this takes place, we ﬁrst
report the percentage of poor farmers who answer the question “which of
your subsistence crops do you sell?” with “corn.” We label this “Occasion-
ally sell corn.” Next we determine the percentage of respondents who re-
port that they never sell corn as the fraction of the poorest who report that
they do not produce to sell but nevertheless answer that they sometimes sell
the corn they grow for subsistence. We label this variable “Never sell corn.”
There is no need to do this for the medium and large corn farmers because
we already know that a majority of these farmers do sell corn in the 
market.
A majority of the poor report that they do not produce to sell. In 1991,
67 percent of the small corn farmers reported that they did not produce to
sell in the market. This ﬁgure peaks at 77 percent in 1993 and falls to 63
percent in 2000. An overwhelming majority of these same farmers, 89 per-
cent in 1991 and 92 percent in 2000, do say that corn is their primary crop
for subsistence. When we allow for the possibility that some of these farm-
ers may sell corn on occasion, the percentages fall and we are left with a
somewhat stronger conclusion. The majority of the poor report that they
never sell corn in all of the eight years for which we have data. For example,
in 1991, 56 percent of the poorest farmers report that they never produce
to sell, and in 2000, 57 percent report that they never produce to sell.
By contrast, only around 33 percent of the medium-sized farmers and 16
percent of the large farmers say that they do not produce to sell. Therefore,
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31. To keep the tables clear and manageable, we leave out the percentage of the population
who report that they do not sell any of their subsistence crop. An analysis of this variable leads
to the same conclusion that the majority of the poor report that they do not sell any of their
subsistence crop.the drop in the price of corn associated with NAFTA does not directly
aﬀect the income of the majority of the poorest corn farmers while it neg-
atively impacts the income of a majority of the medium- and large-scale
corn farmers. Although the employment survey does not ask about expen-
diture, those farmers who report that they do not sell are most certainly net
buyers of corn. It is almost impossible to be completely self-suﬃcient be-
cause of the vagaries of the weather. Thus, among the poorest corn farm-
ers, the majority are net buyers of corn and have thus beneﬁted from any re-
duction in the price of corn associated with NAFTA. The opposite is true
for the medium- and large-scale corn farmers.
Although it is not shown in the tables, we also analyzed the summary sta-
tistics by splitting the samples in panels A, B, and C into those who sell and
those who do not sell. In all three cases, the corn farmers who report that
they do not produce to sell are poorer, older, and less well educated, and
have less land than the farmers who do produce to sell. Additionally, the
corn farmers who report that they do not produce to sell also report that
the majority of their income comes in the form of family consumption,
while those who do produce to sell report that the majority of their income
comes in the form of proﬁts (table 5.10). With only one exception, all
groups and subgroups of corn farmers saw their real income decline sub-
stantially between 1991 and 2000. Only large corn farmers experienced a
substantial increase in their income between 1995 and 2000. If we split
large farmers into those who produce to sell and those who do not produce
to sell, we ﬁnd that the larger corn farmers who do not produce to sell ac-
tually experienced a decline in their real income over the period 1991–2000.
However, the increase in the incomes of those large farmers who do pro-
duce to sell is even more dramatic (from Mex$684 per month to Mex$1,162
per month) once we remove the large corn farmers who do not produce
to sell.
In table 5.10, we check whether there has been a signiﬁcant change in the
characteristics and real income of corn farmers pre- and post-NAFTA. In
terms of both magnitude and statistical signiﬁcance, the most striking
changes are the reduction in the real income of small farmers and the in-
crease in the real income of large farmers. Between 1991 and 2000, small
farmers’ real monthly income dropped by roughly Mex$285, while large
farmers’ real income increased by around Mex$100. Between 1995 and
2000, small farmers’ real income dropped by roughly Mex$93, while large
farmers’ real monthly income increased by around Mex$300.
The drop in the real income of the small farmers can be explained by the
reduction in the price of corn. Although the majority of these farmers do
not participate in the market, they do report that their most important
source of income from their primary occupation is the value of home con-
sumption. Thus, even for those farmers who do not participate in the mar-
ket the imputed value of real income will have fallen.
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zling. However, this could be explained by a number of factors. For ex-
ample, it is consistent with Levy and van Wijnbergen’s (1995) argument
that irrigated farmers would experience an increase in net income because
the gain they experience as a result of the drop in rural wages outweighs the
loss they experience as a result of the reduction in the price of corn. We
hope to explore in more detail the reasons for the gain in large farmers’ real
income in future work.
In summary, the majority of the poorest corn farmers did not sell corn
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Table 5.10 Diﬀerences between corn farmers in 1991 and 2000
Diﬀerences between  Diﬀerences between 
1991–92 and 2000 1994–95 and 2000
Farmer characteristics and 
income (ENE) Diﬀerence t-statistic P-value Diﬀerence t-statistic P-value
A. All corn farmers
Age 1.37 2.95 0.00 1.87 4.16 0.00
Years of schooling 0.50 6.20 0.00 0.31 4.08 0.00
Hours worked 3.07 5.41 0.00 0.52 1.05 0.30
Total land (in hectares) –2.34 –7.07 0.00 –0.19 –0.65 0.52
Income (1994 pesos) –310.46 –23.51 0.00 –71.54 –6.81 0.00
Diﬀerences between  Diﬀerences between 
1991 and 2000 1995 and 2000
Diﬀerence t-statistic P-value Diﬀerence t-statistic P-value
B. Small corn farmers
Real income (1994 pesos) –284.72 –23.84 0.00 –92.47 –9.43 0.00
Age 1.88 3.31 0.00 2.01 3.94 0.00
Years of schooling 0.48 5.22 0.00 0.26 2.93 0.00
Hours worked 3.45 5.15 0.00 0.31 0.56 0.58
Total land (in hectares) –0.31 –6.09 0.00 –0.03 –0.47 0.64
C. Medium corn farmers
Real income (1994 pesos) –271.79 –8.79 0.00 –2.71 –0.10 0.92
Age 0.97 1.03 0.31 –0.19 –0.19 0.85
Years of schooling 0.66 3.58 0.00 0.60 3.18 0.00
Hours worked 5.94 4.75 0.00 1.70 1.34 0.18
Total land (in hectares) –0.07 –0.46 0.64 –0.03 –0.17 0.86
D. Large corn farmers
Real income (1994 pesos) 104.25 1.03 0.30 300.03 2.09 0.04
Age 5.76 3.22 0.00 1.03 0.50 0.62
Years of schooling 1.16 3.27 0.00 –0.34 –0.77 0.44
Hours worked –4.36 –1.86 0.06 –0.81 –0.33 0.74
Total land (in hectares) –1.84 –0.49 0.62 –12.40 –1.70 0.09
Source: ENE 1991, 1995, 2000.
Notes: P-values indicate probability that diﬀerence is not equal to zero. “Corn farmer” is deﬁned as a
farmer who identiﬁes his primary occupation in the cultivation of corn and beans.Table 5.11 Income and consumption of families of corn farmers in 1992 and 2000 by standard
of living
Change Change 
1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 1992/2000 1994/2000
A. Low-income corn-farming families
Real monthly corn consumption 
(means)
Value (1994 pesos) 77.15 71.63 79.97 62.73 53.70 –23.45∗∗∗ –17.93∗∗∗
As a share of food expenditures 0.28 0.24 0.28 0.26 0.22 –0.06 –0.01
As a share of total expenditures 0.15 0.12 0.17 0.14 0.13 –0.02 0.01
Quantity (kilograms) 17.31 18.86 18.74 17.73 19.68 2.37∗∗ 0.82
Real monthly income (means)
Work income 78.97 99.34 114.35 86.93 89.24 10.27∗∗∗ –10.10∗∗∗
Proﬁt income 240.94 242.68 191.42 151.28 114.30 –126.64∗∗∗ –128.38∗∗∗
Other income 2.15 1.28 1.25 1.92 1.68 –0.47 0.40
Income from transfers (other) 44.45 62.94 83.51 75.46 121.91 77.46∗∗∗ 58.98∗∗∗
Income from transfers 
(remittances) 42.02 58.40 38.69 46.32 39.23 –2.79 –19.17∗∗∗
No. of observations 438,613 365,409 445,568 470,569 352,983
B. Middle-income corn-farming families
Real monthly corn consumption 
(means)
Value (1994 pesos) 75.93 63.49 80.64 67.49 62.58 –13.35∗∗∗ –0.91
As a share of food expenditures 0.19 0.16 0.20 0.18 0.17 –0.03 0.00
As a share of total expenditures 0.10 0.07 0.10 0.09 0.08 –0.02 0.01
Quantity (kilograms) 15.71 15.59 17.85 16.57 18.60 2.90∗∗ 3.01∗∗
Real monthly income (means)
Work income 134.72 189.20 195.81 177.06 187.89 53.17∗∗∗ –1.31
Proﬁt income 468.93 370.02 255.29 291.64 192.61 –276.32∗∗∗ –177.41∗∗∗
Other income 4.30 9.42 13.85 10.52 13.20 8.90 3.78
Income from transfers (other) 111.56 87.33 145.60 110.04 215.28 103.72∗∗∗ 127.95∗∗∗
Income from transfers 
(remittances) 97.17 78.50 101.16 60.93 111.61 14.44∗∗ 33.11∗∗∗
No. of observations 324,016 407,348 469,429 353,566 329,765
C. High-income corn-farming families
Real monthly corn consumption 
(means)
Value (1994 pesos) 79.31 55.63 59.47 52.82 48.83 –30.48∗∗∗ –6.80∗∗
As a share of food expenditures 0.12 0.09 0.11 0.11 0.10 –0.02 0.01
As a share of total expenditures 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.04 –0.01 0.00
Quantity (kilograms) 15.90 12.30 12.00 12.01 12.40 –3.49∗∗ 0.10∗∗
Real monthly income (means)
Work income 277.24 316.34 320.04 277.43 286.95 9.71∗∗ –29.38∗∗
Proﬁt income 617.19 599.82 537.21 624.13 807.63 190.44∗∗∗ 207.81∗∗∗
Other income 60.90 8.34 17.45 20.87 26.12 –34.78∗∗ 17.78∗∗
Income from transfers (other) 163.15 253.37 296.93 270.22 294.48 131.33∗∗∗ 41.11∗∗∗
Income from transfers 
(remittances) 20.19 147.74 190.17 167.40 159.44 39.25∗∗ 11.70∗∗∗
No. of observations 372,611 475,855 450,238 373,118 298,706
Source: ENIGH.
Notes: Consumption ﬁgures include corn purchases, corn produced for household’s consumption, and in-kind
payments and gifts of corn. “Corn farmer” is deﬁned as someone who identiﬁes his or her primary occupation
as the cultivation of corn and beans. All means computed using population weights. The last two columns re-
port the change in mean between 1992 and 2000 and then between 1994 and 2000.
∗∗∗Signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level.
∗∗Signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.in the market prior to NAFTA. Therefore, their income will not have been
directly aﬀected by the forces of globalization associated with NAFTA and
the devaluation of the peso. By contrast, a majority of the medium and
large corn farmers did sell corn in the market prior to NAFTA and contin-
ued to do so after the implementation of NAFTA. Thus, we conclude that
the medium-sized corn farmers experienced a sharp decline in real income
as a result of NAFTA. The income of the largest corn farmers has in-
creased. Without additional information, it is not possible to attribute the
increase in the incomes of the large corn farmers to globalization.
Results from the Household Surveys (ENIGH)
We turn now to the families of those individuals who identify their pri-
mary occupation as the cultivation of corn and beans. Speciﬁcally, we ex-
amine household expenditure on corn products and the sources of total
household income. Ideally, we would like to have this information for the
same individuals interviewed in the employment survey. This would allow
us to understand whether the poorest families who say they do not sell any
corn rely on other sources of income that might be indirectly aﬀected by
the price of corn, such as wage income derived from working on other
people’s corn farms. Unfortunately, the surveys were not conducted in this
fashion. Therefore, we split our sample into three groups based on income
from proﬁts on the grounds that income from proﬁts is very closely corre-
lated with the size of the landholding. Thus, we take the families in the bot-
tom tercile of the distribution of income from proﬁts as the representative
families of the corn farmers with less than 5 ha of land. Similarly, those in
the middle of the distribution represent the families of the medium-sized
corn farmers, and those in the top third of the distribution represent the
families of the largest corn farmers (those with more than 15 ha of land).
Panel A of table 5.11 reveals that for the average low-income corn-
farming family real monthly expenditure on corn decreased by around
Mex$20 per month over the period 1994–2000. This amounts to around
US$2 per month or US$24 per year for the poorest corn-farming families.
We noted in the discussion of these data that this would be an upper bound
on the beneﬁts to the poorest corn-farming families as a result of the drop
in the price of corn. This is because these families are so poor that they of-
ten cannot aﬀord to buy corn and so will go without and because the con-
sumption ﬁgures include the value of home consumption. For the poor-
est corn-farming families, the share of corn in food expenditure stayed
roughly constant at around 25 percent, and the share of corn expenditure
in total expenditure stayed roughly constant at around 15 percent.
On the income side, the big changes for the poorest families over the pe-
riod are the drop in the proﬁt share of income and the increase in transfers.
Monthly income from proﬁts was around Mex$130 higher in 1992 and
1994 than it was in 2000. On the other hand, transfer income increased
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farming drops only slightly. Since expenditure on corn changed only mar-
ginally and since work income was hardly aﬀected, we conclude that the
welfare of those families who do not sell corn in the market—the majority
of the poorest corn farmers—has been largely unaﬀected by the drop in the
price of corn. Moreover, these families have beneﬁted from the income sup-
port programs associated with NAFTA.
Panel B of table 5.11 reveals a diﬀerent story; the drop in the price of
corn negatively impacted the majority of middle-income families. This is
because the majority of these farmers do sell corn in the market. Total
monthly expenditure on corn for these farmers has barely changed over
time. As with the poorest corn farmers, work income has also not changed
much over time. The proﬁt share of income for the middle-income corn
farmers fell by Mex$276 between 1992 and 2000 and by Mex$177 between
1994 and 2000. This represents a reduction in real income of almost 50 per-
cent. This was almost entirely oﬀset by the increase in government trans-
fers (Mex$128) and the increase in remittances (Mex$33).
Panel C of table 5.11 demonstrates that both proﬁt income and income
from transfers increased substantially over this time period. Other sources
of income were largely unaﬀected. Income from proﬁts for the high-income
corn farmers increased by Mex$190 between 1992 and 2000 and by
Mex$208 between 1994 and 2000. This amounts to an increase in real in-
come of roughly 33 percent. Thus, the majority of the high-income fami-
lies beneﬁted from changes in the Mexican corn market.
There are several other interesting trends that stand out in table 5.12.
First, households from all income groups witnessed an increase in income
associated with government transfers from programs like PROGRESA
and PROCAMPO. The largest percentage increase was given to the poor-
est corn-farming families, whose income from transfers increased by 200
percent, going from Mex$44 a month to Mex$122 a month between 1992
and 2000. Although transfers to the middle- and upper-income corn-
farming families increased by less in percentage terms (100 percent), in ab-
solute terms these families receive substantially more than the poorest
corn-farming families in transfer payments from the government. For ex-
ample, in 2000, the average middle-income family received a monthly pay-
ment of Mex$215, while the average upper-income family received a
monthly payment of almost Mex$300—roughly three times what the poor
household received.
Second, the increase in transfer payments may explain part of the mys-
terious increase in corn production even though the real price of corn has
fallen dramatically. Levy and van Wijnbergen (1995) discuss this possibil-
ity in great detail. Liberalization of the corn sector under NAFTA creates
an incentive problem. Because many corn farmers will be hurt, the gov-
ernment has an incentive to compensate these farmers for their losses. Levy
and van Wijnbergen estimate that the eﬃciency gains associated with
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pensate the losers. However, compensating farmers pro rata to their corn
production will create an incentive to continue to grow corn even in the
face of falling market prices.
5.4.4 Discussion
While thought provoking, our analysis suﬀers from two important short-
comings. First, we consider only the ﬁrst-order eﬀects of price changes on
income and consumption expenditure while ignoring both the partial equi-
librium eﬀects of food price changes on quantities demanded and supplied
and the general equilibrium eﬀects of the price changes on employment pat-
terns, wages, the price of other factors, and technological innovation. Thus,
our analysis is best thought of as a good approximation to what happened
in the short run (see, for example, Barrett and Dorosh 1996).
We focus here on short-run impacts of globalization for two related
reasons. First, using short-run changes seems to be most appropriate for
studying the impact of price changes on the poor, who, as Barrett and
Dorosh (1996) say, are “likely to be teetering on the brink of survival” and
less able to take advantage of supply-side eﬀects of price changes. And sec-
ond, our primary goal is to understand whether globalization has aﬀected
the poorest corn farmers. In future work, we will incorporate the general
equilibrium eﬀects of changes in the price of corn. In particular, an impor-
tant group that we have not considered here is farm workers. Though not
technically corn farmers, these people are likely to be among the poorest
of the rural population and their livelihoods signiﬁcantly impacted by
changes in the price of corn.
We are also—in part—limited by our data. Since our data sets are not
panels but are repeated cross sections, there is a concern that our results
might suﬀer from selection bias. The composition of small, medium, and
large corn farmers could be changing over time, as could the structure of
the larger corn-farming sector. This means that we could be picking up a
compositional eﬀect rather than the eﬀect of globalization. It is clear from
table 5.7 that the absolute number of families in which at least one person
reports that his primary occupation is corn farming has fallen over the past
decade. Therefore, it is possible that some poor corn farmers left corn
farming for other, better-paying jobs and that those particular corn farm-
ers could have been the most able, educated ones. Thus, the negative impact
on corn farmers that we observe in the cross-sectional data over time could
be partially a result of the corn farmers with the best outside opportunities
(something that likely correlates well with present income) leaving corn
farming. Any complete statement about changes in the overall welfare of
corn farmers would need to take selection into account and to correct for
it when studying the impact of globalization on poor corn farmers. It is also
independently interesting to study which corn farmers were able to adjust
and leave corn farming when the price of corn decreased, and which were
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production of corn.
However, our conclusion that the majority of the poorest corn farmers
and their families have not been hurt by globalization is likely to hold re-
gardless of the shortcomings of our analysis. This is because these people
were so poor to begin with that it is hard to imagine them being worse oﬀ
as a result of globalization. They were not selling corn in the market, and
they did not rely heavily on income from work. Hence, for these people
there is really only upside potential.
5.5 Conclusion
This paper documents the historical impacts of OECD agricultural poli-
cies on developing countries. We ﬁrst provide evidence that the majority of
poor countries are net importers of both cereals and food but net exporters
of agricultural products as a whole. This has been true throughout the post-
colonial era. Even middle-income countries that export food products are
net importers of cereals, particularly in the 1990s. Thus, to the extent that
OECD support policies depress the price of cereals and food, these pro-
grams beneﬁt consumers in poor countries. Of course, even if a country is a
net importer, competition from subsidized imports will hurt the net sellers
of these products within the importing countries. However, there is a grow-
ing body of evidence—consistent with our evidence from Mexico—indi-
cating that the poorest individuals in the poorest countries are actually net
buyers of cereals and food and therefore beneﬁt from lower food prices.32
Our econometric results are consistent with this evidence and suggest
that in many food-importing developing countries, OECD support poli-
cies are not correlated with the poverty rate or with income, even after con-
trolling for domestic policies such as openness to trade. Consequently, the
results suggest that OECD agricultural policies do not have a uniform im-
pact on developing-country incomes; net food-importing countries are
likely to gain, while food exporters are likely to be hurt.
In the high-proﬁle case of Mexico, we ﬁnd that NAFTA reduced the
wedge between the real producer price and the border price, making corn
production less proﬁtable. We also ﬁnd that the poorest corn farmers are
net food buyers, since they have little land per person and so are forced to
earn cash income in other ways in order to buy food. Therefore, the reduc-
tion in corn prices was unambiguously good for the majority of the poor-
est corn farmers. However, we also ﬁnd that middle-income corn farmers
have been hit hard, as their real income from corn farming fell by more
than 50 percent while the average income of the largest corn farmers in-
creased by almost 40 percent. Although the price of corn is no longer di-
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32. See, for example, Levinsohn and McMillan’s piece on Ethiopia (chap. 13 in this vol-
ume).rectly supported by the Mexican government, transfer payments to corn
farmers at all levels of income increased substantially between 1991 and
2000. Because these payments are often tied to amount of land cultivated
with corn, their increase may explain the puzzle of increasing corn pro-
duction in the face of falling corn prices.
Our ﬁndings may be taken as a note of caution in the context of argu-
ments for wholesale multilateral agricultural trade liberalization in indus-
trial countries as a means of alleviating poverty in developing countries.
The aggregate eﬃciency gains associated with trade liberalization, a topic
not addressed in this paper, may mask negative impacts for many develop-
ing countries, particularly the poorest. Trade negotiators may need to con-
sider means of protecting these countries from the negative eﬀects of
higher commodity prices, at least in the short run, and developing coun-
tries may ﬁnd it advantageous to advocate for more far-reaching liberal-
ization in the cotton, dairy, and sugar markets rather than in the markets
for bulk grain commodities that they import.
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Appendix
Table 5A.1 Description of variables and data sources
Variable name Source Description
(continued)
OECD average nominal protection
coeﬃcient. Data included in regres-
sion as weighted average across com-
modities where weights are produc-
tion shares for major commodity
classes. These commodity classes are
wheat, maize, rice, other grains,
oilseeds, sugar, milk, beef, sheep
meat, wool, pig meat, poultry, eggs,
coﬀee, cocoa, roots and tubers, fruits,
and vegetables (including melons).
Data available from OECD for period
1987–2000 and ERS/USDA for
period 1982–87.
SourceOECD agriculture support 




USDA Economic Research Service
Trade Issues data, available at
http://usda.mannlib.cornell.edu/
OECDPOLICY
Southern Oscillation Index anomaly National Oceanic and Atmospheric




Constant US$(1985), real GDP per
capita
Penn World Tables 6.1 Log average in-
come per capita
Constant US$(1985); fraction of pop-
ulation with income less than $1 per
day
World Bank PovertyNet Head count
poverty rateTable 5A.2 Rural poverty lines for Mexico
Monthly per capita poverty lines (1994 pesos) 1994 1996 1998 2000
Food poverty/extreme poverty 43.29 87.61 117.52 139.78
Asset poverty/moderate poverty 82.78 159.21 208.76 254.50
$1/day poverty line 68.51 124.29 173.8 219.24
$2/day poverty line 137.02 248.58 347.6 438.48
Sources: ENIGH, ENE, World Bank (2004).
Notes: Food poverty is deﬁned as the income required to purchase a food basket to satisfy
minimum nutritional requirements. Asset poverty uses Engel coeﬃcients to estimate the non-
food component of income. Since our income data are in real 1994 pesos and the poverty line
estimates were originally in 2000 pesos, we used the general CPI to convert the poverty lines
to real 1994 pesos. Income from corn farming is only reported in the last three years because
the available data for the earlier years do not correspond to the years available household
data.
Table 5A.1 (continued)
Log of rate of inﬂation plus one World Development Indicators Ln (1   inﬂation
rate)
Exports and imports in constant
US$(1985) at market exchange rate.
GDP is in PPP$(1985)
World Development Indicators Exports  
import/GDP
Data included in regression as
weighted average across commodities
where weights are production shares
for major commodity classes listed
above in 1970. Production share data
from FAO.
FAOSTAT data on agricultural produc-
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Comment Mitali Das
McMillan, Zwane, and Ashraf (hereafter MZA) have written an interest-
ing paper, which asks whether large agricultural subsidies in rich countries
aﬀect rural incomes in poor ones. Many observers will agree that an answer
to this question is imperative in resolving the debate over and designing
theappropriate WTO policy on OECD agricultural subsidies. The simplest
story for a link is as follows: subsidies allow rich farmers to sell on the
world market at below-cost prices; these are transmitted to producer prices
in poor nations; and these in turn aﬀect the incomes of the agrarian popu-
lation. Under this transmission from rich farmers’ subsidies to poor farm-
ers’ incomes, net exporters among poor nations would realize lower agrar-
ian incomes while net importers would beneﬁt from higher ones. MZA test
this hypothesis empirically.
There are three key results of MZA that I note. First, MZA ﬁnd that
agriculture subsidies in OECD nations do indeed aﬀect rural incomes in
poor nations. They aﬀect them in a nonlinear manner, but not in the ex-
pected manner: rural incomes among net importers are found to be de-
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Mitali Das is an associate professor of economics at Columbia University.creasing as OECD support increases, while rural income for net exporters
is falling as OECD support for the commodities they grow increases. A sec-
ond result I discuss is ancillary to the paper (admittedly, it is also not dis-
cussed by the authors) but is implied by a robustness test that MZA carry
out. It suggests that once OECD subsidies are accounted for, growth (to
misquote Dollar and Kraay 2002) is no longer good for the poor. Finally, a
third ﬁnding is that in post-NAFTA Mexico, corn farmers’ incomes fell
substantially following the ﬂood of heavily subsidized corn imports from
the United States.
The ﬁrst result is the most tenuous. It is logically inconsistent with the
theoretical predictions of any reasonable model. Apart from poor data
quality, measurement error, and small sample size (which MZA point to),
the methodological implementation raises issues that very plausibly lead
to the unexpected results. These are elaborated upon below.
The second result is less tenuous but is nevertheless surprising. It is over-
looked in the paper but merits discussion for this simple reason: the ap-
proximate unit elasticity of the lowest quintile’s income to average income
is an empirical regularity that apparently withstands controls for country
fundamentals (GDP, exports/imports, inﬂation rates), social development
(secondary school enrollment, rule-of-law indexes), and ﬁnancial-sector
development; see Dollar and Kraay (2002). Yet MZA’s inclusion of con-
trols for OECD support policy attenuates this elasticity until it is indistin-
guishable from zero. While this is possible in principle, the paper is void of
any discussion on this by-product of the empirical results. Explanations for
this ﬁnding will be suggested here.
I am in general agreement with the third result. There is broad consen-
sus about agrarian incomes in post-NAFTA Mexico, in both popular and
academic circles.1 The raw data in MZA support this consensus. Causality
is still diﬃcult to establish, however. There are two suggestions I will make.
One is to supplement their descriptive statistics with minimal regression
analysis or statistical tests of equality. The second is to balance the discus-
sion of income losses with the economic gains due to NAFTA (DeLong
2000) and discuss net welfare gains.
A more detailed discussion of the ﬁrst two results follows. To this end, it
is useful to specify the model MZA estimate, which can be succinctly sum-
marized as
(1) Income of lowest quintileit   OECDpoliciesit 1   OECDpolicies2
it 2
  X  it  εit,
where OECDpolicies represents a measure of the OECD subsidy policies
that are relevant for (poor) nation i at time t, and X denotes controls.
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1. See, e.g., “Dumping without Borders” (Oxfam 2003).Result 1: From Rich Farmers’ Subsidies to Poor Farmers’ Incomes
To approximate OECD subsidies on the commodities produced in poor
ones (i.e., to measure “OECDpolicies”), MZA adopt a quite reasonable
approach, using a weighted average of the net protection coeﬃcient (NPC)
for each commodity produced by the rich nations. Commodities not pro-
duced get a zero NPC, and weights are the share of the commodity in the
poor nation’s output. Using this measure, instrumental variables estimates
are derived from the model in equation (1). Estimates of  1 and  2 are
found to be negative and positive respectively, leading to the unexpected
U-shaped response of income of the lowest quintile to OECDpolicies men-
tioned earlier. Below, I suggest what could lead to this result, and I also sug-
gest methodological changes that could recover the expected result.
Point A: Net Importers and Net Exporters
How in fact might OECD subsidies be viewed from a poor nation’s per-
spective? It depends. For a net exporter, agrarian incomes are decreasing
in OECD subsidies ( 1   0,  2   0), while for a net importer the opposite
ought to be true ( 1   0,  2   0). Without separating net exporters from
importers, therefore, a null hypothesis on  1 and  2 in equation (1) cannot
be formulated. This is a potentially leading cause of confounding the esti-
mates obtained in equation (1).
To address this, two approaches come to mind. One is to weight the NPC
nonmonotonically (from –1 to 0 for importers and 0 to 1 for net exporters).
This would ﬁt nicely here because the relevant partial eﬀect is evaluated at
a particular level of OECDpolicies, which is negative for net importers and
positive for exporters. With this speciﬁcation, one could expect that the
sign of the eﬀect on the lowest quintile’s income in net importers would be,
in general, inverted from that for net exporters.2 A limitation of this ap-
proach is that it would a priori require that the absolute eﬀect of OECD
policies is identical for net importers and exporters. An alternative is in-
clusion of an interaction between the subsidy variable and an indicator for
exporter/importer status:
(2)Income of lowest quintileit   OECDpoliciesit 1   OECDpolicies2
it 2
  NetExit   OECDpoliciesit 3   NetExit
  OECDpolicies2
it 4   X  it  εit,
where NetEx is an indicator for net exporters.
Here, the null hypotheses are { 1   0,  2   0,  2    4   0,  1    3   0}.
Additionally, an interesting testable hypothesis is for symmetry in re-
sponses—that is, whether the reduction in poverty for net importers from
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2. It would depend on the magnitude of the coeﬃcient for the linear part.a unit increase in OECDpolicies is equivalent in absolute magnitude to the
increase in poverty for net exporters. Because net exporters’ incomes are
directly linked with reductions in price, while net importers’ income might
be less so, an asymmetric response could be expected. More generally,
some evidence indicates that income gains in poor nations accrue largely to
the upper quintile (Das and Mohapatra 2003).
I would recommend that MZA reestimate the alternative model in equa-
tion (2) and test each of these hypotheses directly.
Point B: Weighting Choices
Weights used in the MZA approach are the shares, in 1970, of the
OECD-subsidized commodity in the poor nation’s output. A potential
problem with this dating approach is of misstating the true eﬀect of OECD
subsidies, because nations very likely adjust their crop allocation to the
most proﬁtable combinations over time. For instance, net exporters might
appropriately shift away from commodities that are persistently heavily
subsidized in OECD nations, because they lead to lower world prices and
lowered proﬁts.3 Then, even if point A was irrelevant, the estimates would
be statistically biased and inconsistent. Because crop allocation and plan-
ning do not generally adjust instantaneously to foreign subsidy levels, one
suspects that current allocations are less likely to be determined by current
subsidy levels (MZA) and more likely to be aﬀected by previous subsidy
levels.
To this end, I would recommend that MZA compare the 1970 shares of
the commodities in the poor nations’ output with more contemporaneous
ones, to determine whether it is appropriate to proceed with 1970 shares in
construction of the key variable OECDpolicies.
Result 2: Growth Is No Longer Good for the Poor?
I refer here to results obtained in table 5.8 (last column, ﬁrst row).
To preserve comparability with other research on poverty, MZA per-
form a series of robustness tests. In particular, MZA include the set of con-
trols from Dollar and Kraay (2002) where income of the lowest quintile is
a function of average income, country fundamentals, social indicators,
ﬁnancial sector variable and region eﬀects. The elasticity of the poor’s in-
come to average income is found to be stable (approximately unity) and ro-
bust to a wide range of speciﬁcations; see Dollar and Kraay (2002). This
implies that the lowest quintile’s income rises approximately one-for-one
with income, and lays the basis for the “Growth is good for the poor” as-
sertion.
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3. As a heuristic point, India’s export share of tea has reduced from 40 percent to approxi-
mately 13 percent between 1960 and 1992 (Indian Child).Primarily because this ﬁnding is robust to many potential determinants
of growth, it is surprising that the result attenuates (it is indistinguishable
from zero) when MZA include the controls for OECDpolicies. The OECD
policy variables themselves are by and large statistically signiﬁcant, and
they indicate that OECD support is more important than average income
as a determinant of poverty. How shall we interpret this? Could OECD poli-
cies have suﬃciently strong eﬀects to wipe out the apparently robust rela-
tion between growth and poverty?
My intuition is pulled in two directions here.
On the one hand, in light of points A and B for result 1, instrumental
variables estimates of table 5.8 could be biased, and the suggested pattern
spurious. This is a plausible argument because the signs of the eﬀects are
contrary to what might be expected.4
On the other hand, even if the speciﬁc results of table 5.8 are inaccurate
(because of, say, small samples), OECD policies could have strong enough
eﬀects to make growth irrelevant (or less important) for the lowest quin-
tile’s income. One reason is the sheer size of the rural population in less-
developed nations, which the World Bank estimates to be 76 percent of the
total population in poor nations (see MZA’s table 5.1). Anecdotal evidence
indicates that the rural population derives a large share of their income di-
rectly from crops; for example, in 2000 data, Mexican farmers indicated
that 56 percent of their income was directly derived from corn and beans
(MZA’s table 5.11). In this way, a large fraction of income, for a large frac-
tion of the population, depends directly on prices for the crops they grow.
These prices aﬀect not just the lowest quintile’s income but average income
as well (the share size of the rural population is well over 20 percent, as in-
dicated above). A schematic for this scenario is shown in ﬁgure 5C.1.
What this schematic implies for regression analysis is that, where OECD
policies and average income are both determinants of the lowest quintile’s
income and OECD subsidy policies are an important determinant of aver-
age income, the regression coeﬃcient on the variable OECDpolicies could
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4. The sums of the coeﬃcients indicate that OECD policies lead to reductions in poverty or
increases in lowest quintile’s incomes, in all regions of the world except for Eastern and Cen-
tral Europe.
Fig. 5C.1 Possible attenuation of the regression coeﬃcient of average incomesimply denote the net eﬀect (of the policies plus that of average income) on
the lowest quintile’s income. If OECD subsidy policies are negatively cor-
related with average income, as they should be for net exporters, the re-
gression coeﬃcient on average income will attenuate. This is one explana-
tion for the ﬁnding in table 5.8.
However, MZA would also have to address net exporters and importers
(result 1A) in order to precisely estimate whether OECD subsidy policies
matter more than growth for poverty.
Conclusions
This paper is a good starting point in quantifying the impact of rich na-
tions’ food subsidies on poor nations’ incomes. The importance of this
topic is well understood in the policy literature, and MZA must be con-
gratulated for analyzing a quite diﬃcult and contentious policy issue. The
empirical exercise raises challenges similar to those in other cross-country
regression analyses, and it is further complicated by small samples. The
usual interpretational issues arise, and causality is quite diﬃcult to estab-
lish in the face of coincidental global and regional shocks.
Additional data could help resolve some of these problems. In particu-
lar, I would suggest the authors use larger samples to explore the premise
that I outline in result 2: is a key determinant of the relation between low-
est quintile’s income and average income operating simply through policies
such as the OECD subsidies?
The Mexico case study using microdata could potentially overcome
many of these problems, so future work might focus on understanding the
patterns of income growth and reduction using such micro-level data. This
is an important area of research, so I look forward to reading more of the
authors’ research on the matter.
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